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Harripaul: Information Privacy

INFORMATION PRIVACY IN AN AGE OF
INVISIBLE SHOPPER TRACKING: WHO WILL
PAY THE PRICE FOR STORES OF THE FUTURE?
Kristin Harripaul
ABSTRACT
Explosive growth in technology has brought a unique opportunity
to the doors of brick-and-mortar retail—a nearly $3.38 trillion
industry struggling to regain relevance among modern, digitally
enabled shoppers. Specifically, in-store analytics, or shopper
tracking technologies, are allowing these retailers to better compete
with online stores by tapping into consumer data unprecedented in
the brick-and-mortar context. With these technologies, stores now
have access to detailed metrics, like consumer dwell times, journeys,
product engagement, product views, and demographic data such as
age and gender, which can be used to optimize store operations and
marketing and promotions.
Recent events, however, including a string of data breaches and
the passage of strict privacy laws in Europe and California, have
renewed efforts for broad information privacy reform that could have
deleterious consequences for these technologies. This Note examines
the current state of privacy law; two approaches to information
privacy reform that appeared before the 116th Congress, namely
consumer control and business accountability; and the potential
impact of these two regulatory approaches on in-store analytics
technologies. It concludes that properly balancing consumer privacy
and business interests through regulation requires more than a
one-size-fits-all federal band-aid. Instead, it proposes starting with
targeted federal acts aimed at the bigger gaps and outliers in existing
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information privacy law, like brick-and-mortar technologies.
Addressing in-store analytics, specifically, it recommends federal
regulation focused on business-accountability and expanded FTC
powers, and it outlines specific considerations for a targeted act.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) made history by
imposing a record-breaking $5 billion civil penalty on social media
giant Facebook for privacy-related violations.1 According to the FTC,
the penalty “is one of the largest penalties ever assessed by the U.S.
government for any violation” and is “almost [twenty] times greater
than the largest privacy or data security penalty ever imposed
worldwide.”2 But what even warranted such action, and why are
some policymakers saying that the settlement, which includes a
twenty-year agreement for independent privacy oversight, still was
not severe enough?3 The answer lies at the heart of a privacy debate
that has been brewing in the United States for decades, a debate that
grows more complex in an increasingly digital world.4
1. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy
Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftcimposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions [https://perma.cc/CMU4-EVD7]; Lesley
Fair, FTC’s $5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-Breaking and History-Making, FED. TRADE
COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (July 24, 2019, 8:52 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-breaking-history
[https://perma.cc/Q5DBRS6D]; Michael Nuñez, FTC Slaps Facebook with $5 Billion Fine, Forces New Privacy Controls,
FORBES (July 24, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mnunez/2019/07/24/ftcsunprecedented-slap-fines-facebook-5-billion-forces-new-privacy-controls/#3871ada05668.
2. Press Release, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra at 2, 16, In re Facebook, Inc., No.
182-3109, 2019 WL 3451729, at *2, *16 (F.T.C. July 24, 2019) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement of
Commissioner Chopra] (noting that the settlement established a “disappointing precedent” and
essentially offered “blanket immunity for unspecified violations by Facebook and its executives,” and
that the penalty, although “record-breaking,” did not exceed Facebook’s gains); Dissenting Statement of
Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter at 1, 15–16, 19, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 182-3109 (F.T.C. July 24,
2019)
[hereinafter
Dissenting
Statement
of
Commissioner
Slaughter],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1536918/182_3109_slaughter_statement
_on_facebook_7-24-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G8E-6VED] (emphasizing that the injunctive relief the
FTC chose was unlikely to deter Facebook from future violations given that the injunction neither
changed Facebook’s fundamental business model nor held Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg personally
liable, despite signs that the company started violating its original 2012 FTC consent order “early and
often”).
4. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF
SOCIAL LIFE 36–37 (2010) (explaining that increasing technological capabilities fueled information
privacy debates on the “increasing and potentially unlimited uses of computerized databases of personal
information” as early as the 1960s and 1970s); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Archive of the Meetings of
the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (SACAPDS): The Origin of
Fair Information Practices, BERKELEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/bclt/research/privacyat-bclt/archive-of-the-meetings-of-the-secretarys-advisory-committee-on-automated-personal-datasystems-sacapds/ [https://perma.cc/6AMM-R2RZ] (reading 1973 transcripts from the committee that
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For a long time, information privacy concerns have focused on
cyberspace—social media and e-commerce.5 But now, a new wave of
connected technologies and inexpensive forms of data storage are
bringing these concerns to the doors of brick-and-mortar stores, an
industry under particular pressure to transform and regain relevance
among digitally enabled shoppers.6 Specifically, growth in in-store
analytics—or shopper-tracking technologies, which monitor
shoppers’ movements in-store via mechanisms such as video
analytics and mobile tracking—is quickly erasing differences
between how precisely shoppers can be tracked online and inside a
physical store.7
delivered the principles underlying modern privacy legislation and observing that “it is striking how
little conversations about privacy have changed in forty years”); Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler, Privacy in a
Digital World, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 26, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/26/privacyqueen-of-human-rights-in-a-digital-world (explaining how technological progress has caused tension
“between the right to privacy and the extensive data pooling on which the digital economy is based”).
For a more recent example of this tension, consider the outrage surrounding use of Clearview AI’s facial
recognition technology to support law enforcement efforts and contact tracing after the COVID-19
pandemic. Jacob Ward & Chiara Sottile, A Facial Recognition Company Wants to Help with Contact
Tracing. A Senator Has Questions., NBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:29 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/facial-recognition-company-wants-help-contact-tracingsenator-has-questions-n1197291 [https://perma.cc/TZ8G-5EJH].
5. John D. McKinnon, Big Brother at the Mall, WALL ST. J.: BUS. (Apr. 13, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-brother-in-the-mall-11555128005 [https://perma.cc/LQ3V-SXGX].
6. Id.; Altshuler, supra note 4; Lisa Terry, Shopper Tracking: Reinventing and Reimagining the
Store Experience, RIS NEWS (May 31, 2019), https://risnews.com/shopper-tracking-reinventing-andreimagining-store-experience [https://perma.cc/VS9P-S8ER] (“Innovations in cameras, sensors, RFID,
mobile, edge computing and networking technologies are giving retailers new insight . . . .”). See
generally Ronny Max, 19 Technologies of People Tracking, BEHAV. ANALYTICS RETAIL (Jan. 27,
2021), https://behavioranalyticsretail.com/technologies-tracking-people/ (explaining how brick-andmortar technologies are becoming more cost-effective and accurate in real-time); Drew FitzGerald, 5G
Race Could Leave Personal Privacy in the Dust, WALL ST. J.: BUS. (Nov. 11, 2019, 10:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/5g-race-could-leave-personal-privacy-in-the-dust-11573527600
[https://perma.cc/54PZ-L6TH] (“[N]ew 5G networks are expected to bring billions of cameras, sensors
and other ‘smart’ devices . . . . [online, all collecting] reams of data from the world around them . . . .”).
Retail is not the only industry affected by technology growth and adoption—smart cities, smart vehicles,
and smart factories are all in the works. Vasanth Ganesan et al., Video Meets the Internet of Things,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-andtelecommunications/our-insights/video-meets-the-internet-of-things
[https://perma.cc/5SWD-X6T8];
see also Melissa Locker, Facial Recognition Is Coming to Hotels to Make Check-In Easier—and Much
Creepier, FAST CO. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90327875/facial-recognition-iscoming-to-hotels-to-make-check-in-easier-and-much-creepier (describing an ultra-modern boutique
hotel in China that lets guests “scan their faces to expedite the [check-in] process”; make requests
through an “Alexa-like assistant” that controls the temperature, curtains, and lights; and receive room
service deliveries and bar drinks via robots).
7. McKinnon, supra note 5; see also Max, supra note 6 (detailing nineteen different
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For shoppers, the promise of these tracking technologies is a
tailored and convenient shopping experience that is more consistent
with their online experiences.8 However, the premise of in-store
tracking has left some consumer advocates, academics, and key
committee leaders in both the House and Senate uneasy. 9 This
uneasiness is further underscored by the fact that these tracking
technologies are often invisible to the average shopper.10 Despite
these concerns, however, no uniform information privacy law
exists—U.S. privacy law has remained largely self-regulatory and
sectoral, unlike many industrialized nations that protect personal data
in an omnibus fashion. 11 An array of “constitutional protections,
federal and state statutes, torts, regulatory rules, and treaties” regulate
different industries and economic sectors, leaving gaping holes with
little recourse for these new technology-driven problems.12
shopper-tracking mechanisms available in 2020). Video analytics is the use of video sensors placed in
stores to collect insights on the shopper—including demographics, in-store journeys, aisle dynamics,
category performance, and display optimization, among other metrics—to optimize in-store
performance. VideoMining Frequently Asked Questions, VIDEOMINING [hereinafter VideoMining],
http://www.videomining.com/newsroom/articles-white-papers/videomining-frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/HQ9K-M7L4]; see also Max, supra note 6. In contrast, mobile analytics, such as
Wi-Fi analytics, listens for signals from the shopper’s mobile device to detect presence in-store and
captures location data, among other metrics, to optimize in-store performance. WALKBASE, WI-FI
ANALYTICS
FOR
RETAIL
STORES:
BUYER’S
GUIDE
11
(2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/wlkbase/Whitepapers/whitepaper-walkbase-wifi-analytics-buyers-guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GQ3D-SC99].
8. BRP, UNIFIED COMMERCE SURVEY 3 (2019) (finding that 87% of surveyed consumers indicated
an interest in a “personalized and consistent experience across all channels”).
9. McKinnon, supra note 5; see also Daniel Keyes, New In-Store Technologies Could Bring About
Stricter
Regulations,
BUS.
INSIDER:
RETAIL
(Apr.
16,
2019,
10:25
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/new-in-store-technologies-may-bring-regulations-2019-4
[https://perma.cc/69ET-ZTYT]; Ashkan Soltani, Privacy Trade-Offs in Retail Tracking, FED. TRADE
COMM’N:
TECH@FTC
(Apr.
30,
2015,
11:59
AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/techftc/2015/04/privacy-trade-offs-retail-tracking
[https://perma.cc/WP5N-FCAE]
(describing the “obscure” and “controversial” nature of retail tracking and noting consumer distrust with
the technology).
10. See FitzGerald, supra note 6 (explaining that “[p]eople know that they’re being tracked online”
but do not realize that the same applies in-store (quoting Pankaj Srivastava, chief operating officer of
FigLeaf App Inc.)); see also Soltani, supra note 9; Stephanie Thien Hang Nguyen, What the First
Porta-Potty Can Teach Designers About Digital Privacy, FAST CO. (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90409598/what-the-first-porta-potty-can-teach-designers-about-digitalprivacy [https://perma.cc/K7QS-X5H2] (“Without sights, sounds, and touch, [data privacy] feels
practically invisible.”).
11. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
12. Id. (“There is a law for video records and a different law for cable records. The Health Insurance
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Historically, efforts to create a broad information privacy
framework governing how businesses collect, use, share, and protect
personal information have struggled to gain traction.13 But on the
heels of the strict online privacy rules established by the 2018
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union
(EU) and the 2019 California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA),
privacy advocates and business groups alike are now calling on
Congress to create some uniformity amid a growing patchwork of
privacy standards.14 Oddly, despite brick-and-mortar’s control over
the majority of consumer sales, its technologies often figure little into
narrow, online-focused privacy rhetoric or legislation, and what little
guidance does exist leans toward treating online and
brick-and-mortar tracking the same. 15

Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects the privacy of health data, but a different regime
governs the privacy of financial data. In fact, there are several laws that regulate financial data
depending on the industry, and health data is not even uniformly protected . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
13. Allison Grande, What to Watch As Congress Mulls Federal Privacy Legislation, LAW360 (Feb.
25, 2019, 9:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1132337/what-to-watch-as-congress-mullsfederal-privacy-legislation; see also Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game
Today—and
How
to
Change
the
Game,
BROOKINGS
(July
12,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-tochange-the-game/ (inferring that multinational corporations and business interests have long posed a
roadblock to uniform privacy law development, given little incentive and a daunting outlook on dealing
with comprehensive law); Natasha Singer, Why a Push for Online Privacy Is Bogged Down in
Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/technology/obamaseffort-on-consumer-privacy-falls-short-critics-say.html [https://perma.cc/4MVB-T3KH] (providing an
illustrative example of how online privacy initiatives have been subject to “gridlock” due to “clashing
visions for American society and commerce” and noting that it “provides an instructive preview of
looming battles . . . to come”).
14. Grande, supra note 13 (“The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Internet Association and BSA:
The Software Alliance, along with tech giants such as Google, Microsoft and Apple, are among the
stakeholders in the business community that have recently thrown their support
behind . . . uniform . . . privacy rules, with several offering up their own proposed frameworks.”).
15. JOSEPH TUROW, THE AISLES HAVE EYES: HOW RETAILERS TRACK YOUR SHOPPING, STRIP
YOUR PRIVACY, AND DEFINE YOUR POWER 8 (2017) (“Oddly, although these [in-store tracking]
practices relate to the ongoing and widespread public discussion about privacy . . . retailers only barely
figure in the debate. The shopping aisle has, in fact, received almost no attention even among
academics.”); see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., CB20-24, QUARTERLY RETAIL
E-COMMERCE SALES 4TH QUARTER 2019, at 2 tbl.1 (2020) (noting that brick-and-mortar sales
accounted for approximately 89% of total retail sales in 2019); David F. McDowell et al., What the
Nomi Case Could Mean for Retail Tracking, LAW360 (May 19, 2015, 10:10 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/655958/what-the-nomi-case-could-mean-for-retail-tracking
(noting
that based on the FTC’s first settlement against a retail tracking company, “it is reasonable to anticipate
that the FTC will move in a direction that mirrors its position with respect to online tracking . . . .”).
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As such, in-store tracking technologies could be one of the first
casualties of new privacy reform laws, hampering the
brick-and-mortar retailer’s ability to compete in an increasingly
complex and digital world. 16 The following Note discusses how
policymakers should address shopper-tracking practices in
brick-and-mortar amidst prompts for privacy reform. Part I examines
key in-store tracking practices and concerns and the current state of
privacy law. Part II analyzes various bills and proposals, from
privacy advocates and business groups alike, for privacy reform. Part
III proposes specific considerations to balance privacy rights against
support for the next phase of brick-and-mortar innovation—the store
of the future.
I. BACKGROUND
Over the last decade, explosive growth in technology has changed
the rules of engagement, providing businesses with access to massive
pools of data across almost every aspect of consumers’ lives.17 These
technologies have built a rich digital economy and left a trail of
electronic breadcrumbs that businesses, under competitive pressures,
are driven to turn into profit. 18 Furthermore, in an intriguing paradox,
16. Keyes, supra note 9 (“Any future regulations dealing with in-store data privacy will likely
hamper physical retailers’ ability to provide a personalized and convenient shopping experience. If
retailers’ ability to identify and track consumers in-store is restricted, they may struggle to personalize
in-store shopping.”); see also McKinnon, supra note 5 (“[Privacy legislation is] drawing concern from
traditional retailers who worry that their cutting-edge technologies could be banned or disrupted if they
are included under the privacy law.”).
17. Altshuler, supra note 4; Bruce Schneier, Fear and Convenience, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN
AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 200, 202 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015) (“Ephemeral
conversation is becoming increasingly rare . . . .”). See generally Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We
Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:42
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-daythe-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/#1baf020260ba
[https://perma.cc/7CWE-EWZL]
(providing several statistics on the volume and categories of consumer data collected each day); Dylan
Curran, Opinion, Are You Ready? Here Is All the Data Facebook and Google Have on You, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2018, 3:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/allthe-data-facebook-google-has-on-you-privacy [https://perma.cc/94Z3-7BUC] (illustrating the level of
personal information companies like Google and Facebook collect on users).
18. See Jeff Jonas, The Surveillance Society and Transparent You (explaining that organizations of
all shapes and sizes must have access to more information and make sense of it if they hope to survive),
in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, at 93, 94; see also Press
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consumers have been willing contributors to this digital economy
despite mistrusting companies that monitor their behavior.19 They
confess their problems on social media, allow apps to track their
mobile location, and welcome an increasing number of smart
technologies into their lives in exchange for convenience and other
value.20 As a result, industry experts estimate that this digital
economy is “doubling the volume of . . . information in the world
every two years.”21
This nonstop disruption has shaken up the very foundation of
retail, “creating opportunities for new entrants, and making
transformation an imperative for [brick-and-mortar] incumbents” that
are sorely ill-prepared for this digitally enhanced marketplace. 22
Release, Gartner, Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected “Things” Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent
from 2016 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2017-02-07-gartnersays-8-billion-connected-things-will-be-in-use-in-2017-up-31-percent-from-2016
[https://perma.cc/W63K-6RUK] (forecasting that approximately 12.8 billion consumer-connected
devices would be in use in 2020, more than doubling the estimated 5.2 billion devices in use three years
prior).
19. See Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of
Control over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-andfeeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/EJC7-FQJK] (“[A] majority
of Americans report being concerned about the way their data is being used by companies (79%) . . . .”);
see also Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
157, 162 (2019) (highlighting that “contrary to several surveys indicating a consumer preference toward
privacy,” consumers’ “constant tendency to waive their data-related rights” indicates a disinterest in
control and that consumers’ preferences and interests lie elsewhere).
20. See Angus Hervey, Privacy Shouldn’t Be the Price of Progress. Here’s How to Keep Your Data
Safe, QUARTZ (Jan. 26, 2018), https://qz.com/1188898/privacy-shouldnt-be-the-price-of-progress-hereshow-to-keep-your-data-safe/ [https://perma.cc/BV4Z-JK5M]; see also Press Release, supra note 18;
Schneier, supra note 17, at 201–02. See generally Jonas, supra note 18.
21. Kerry, supra note 13.
22. ROD SIDES & BRYAN FURMAN, DELOITTE, 2019 RETAIL OUTLOOK: TRANSITION AHEAD 4
(2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/consumer-business/us-cb-retailoutlook-transition-ahead-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8FN-ZH5L]; Hugo Moreno, How Retailers Can
Make
the
Most
of
Their
Data,
FORBES
(June
28,
2018,
1:03
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2018/06/28/how-retailers-can-make-the-most-of-theirdata/#6b2dd99d453c (“Among the industries that have seen their traditional ways of doing business
upended by the rapid advent of the internet . . . , retail is perhaps one of the most affected. . . . [I]t’s now
increasingly difficult for midsize retailers to remain competitive against the ubiquity and scale of global
online marketplaces while margins dwindle and the costs of meeting customer expectations only
continue to rise.”); Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, Technology Adoption Powers Shift in Retail
Landscape,
BROOKINGS:
TECHTANK
(May
10,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/05/10/technology-adoption-powers-shift-in-retaillandscape/ [https://perma.cc/W772-ZJAQ] (“To stay competitive with online retailers going forward,
traditional retailers must match their pace of innovation.”); Corinne Ruff, Do Retailers Need Innovation
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Modern shoppers—with increased access to information and growing
expectations—have created a nightmare of a moving target for
traditional retail stores that rely on limited transactional and loyalty
data with little visibility into shopper behavior and what shoppers
actually experience inside the physical environment.23 Additionally,
because extracting insight from these traditional sources has minimal
effect on daily decision making, brick-and-mortar retailers have little
means to control their bottom line by adjusting and improving the
shopping experience in real-time.24
As such, analysts believe the retail industry is at “a major
inflection point.”25 Unsurprisingly, brick-and-mortar “retailers are
increasingly turning to data and analytics,” with shopper-tracking
being the number one technology on retailers’ list of
technology-enabled growth strategies for 2021. 26 With everything to
lose, brick-and-mortar is now looking to join the race to turn shopper
data into a meaningful business advantage before online players

Labs to Stay Alive?, RETAIL DIVE: DEEP DIVE (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.retaildive.com/news/doretailers-need-innovation-labs-to-stay-alive/440277/ (“Many retailers today are scrambling to keep pace
with emerging technologies and changing consumer behaviors. Everyone is trying to create stores of the
future . . . .”).
23. See SHOPPER TECH. INST., DIGITAL DISRUPTION IN CPG & RETAIL loc. 198 (2018) (ebook)
(“Current analytical models based on spend data only with limited customer information are unable to
predict shopper interests and purchases.”); see also Karsten & West, supra note 22 (explaining how
online retailers “can gather customer data with every click and then rapidly redesign their website to
boost sales, [while] brick-and-mortar stores might only track final purchases”); Rajeev Sharma,
Adapting to the New Cherry-Picking Shopper, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:57 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/it-wont-be-easy-making-money-off-of-cherry-picking-shoppers1416877025 [https://perma.cc/Z3K4-MYFC] (explaining how modern, cherry-picking shoppers are
“spoiled for choice” and “won’t be very lucrative unless stores adapt”); VideoMining, supra note 7
(discussing the limits on the sales and loyalty card data brick-and-mortar already holds).
24. Terry, supra note 6 (describing the store floor as a “previously data-dark place”); see also
RETAILWIRE RSCH., HOW SHOPPER INSIGHTS ARE FUELING RETAIL PROGRESS 2 (2014) (finding that
84% of brick-and-mortar incumbents describe themselves as “newbies” and “getting there” in
harnessing their data); SIDES & FURMAN, supra note 22, at 14 (“For years, the industry struggled with
how to create and use data.”). See generally Jia Wertz, Why Brick and Mortar Retailers Need
E-Commerce-Style Data Tracking Methods, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:15 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jiawertz/2017/12/18/brick-and-mortar-retailers-need-e-commerce-styledata-tracking/#7f562f9280eb [https://perma.cc/U9D9-3RVZ] (indicating that brick-and-mortar data has
been very difficult to access and turn into actionable insight for use in daily decision-making processes).
25. SIDES & FURMAN, supra note 22, at 3; see also Max, supra note 6.
26. Moreno, supra note 22; see also JOE SKORUPA, RIS NEWS, 29TH ANNUAL RETAIL TECHNOLOGY
STUDY: RETAIL ACCELERATES 16 fig.4 (2019), https://risnews.com/29th-annual-retail-technologystudy-retail-accelerates.
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render stores obsolete. 27 Despite a general lack of agility, budgetary
barriers, and legacy system integration problems, already 11% of
retail stores have adopted in-store tracking technologies, and 41%
plan to invest in shopper tracking capabilities for 2021.28
A. In-Store Tracking and Related Privacy Concerns
The desire to collect data on shoppers is not a new practice;
retailers have been doing it for decades.29 But now, retailers like
Walmart, Target, Macy’s, Nordstrom, Cabela’s, and many more are
building stores of the future and gathering new categories of
consumer behavioral data through a variety of methods.30
In particular, retail stores are beginning to tap into data
unprecedented in the brick-and-mortar context, with in-store tracking
technologies, like video and mobile analytics that monitor consumers
through the use of video and cellphone signals.31 With these
technologies, physical stores have access to many of the analytics
already available to online stores, including traffic counts, in-store
journeys, product engagement, products viewed, dwell times, and
demographic data such as gender and age range. 32 These metrics can
be used to optimize layout and store planning, staffing and
merchandising, and marketing and promotions.33
27. Jonas, supra note 18; see also SIDES & FURMAN, supra note 22; SKORUPA, supra note 26;
Moreno, supra note 22.
28. SKORUPA, supra note 26, at 14 fig.2, 18. Some online players are also making plans including
in-store tracking technologies—retail behemoth Amazon is planning to open 3,000 cashierless stores
built on a mix of tracking and other technologies across the U.S. by 2021. Rani Molla, Amazon’s
Cashierless Go Stores Could Be a $4 Billion Business by 2021, New Research Suggests, VOX (Jan. 4,
2019, 10:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/1/4/18166934/amazon-go-stores-revenue-estimatescashierless.
29. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_r=1&ref=charlesduhigg
[https://perma.cc/F2TU-BSGP].
30. TUROW, supra note 15, at 3; Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is
Tracking
Your
Cell,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
14,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attention-shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html
[https://perma.cc/S5LB-RSZ2].
31. See, e.g., Clifford & Hardy, supra note 30 (highlighting the use of video and mobile tracking to
learn gender, time spent in certain aisles, and time spent looking at specific merchandise); see also
Terry, supra note 6.
32. McKinnon, supra note 5; Terry, supra note 6; Max, supra note 6.
33. Terry, supra note 6; Anne Stephen, Finding the ROI in Retail In-Store Analytics, STREET FIGHT
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The type of data collected from these tracking devices varies from
one solution and provider to the next, but generally, the data
collected is labeled as either personal information, also known as
personally identifiable information (PII), or nonidentifiable
information.34 PII is commonly used to describe information that
uniquely identifies a shopper, typically by name, whereas
nonidentifiable information does not identify the shopper and is not
considered linkable to that specific shopper.35 Notably, these neat
labels often offer a fictitious distinction given the “messiness” and
“malleable nature” of big data and the fact that nonidentifiable data
can increasingly be reidentified as technology advances.36
In brick-and-mortar, as well as online, the ability to aggregate
different data sets and thereby generate additional consumer
information beyond the limits of provided data sets is a key concern
with tracking technologies. 37 The idea is that, under the guise of
promised benefits like “convenience,” companies aggregate
expansive amounts of consumer data to construct precise personality,
psychological, and behavioral profiles in an effort to automate buying
behavior and essentially erode personal choice. 38
(Jan.
5,
2015),
https://streetfightmag.com/2015/01/05/finding-the-roi-in-retail-in-storeanalytics/#.Xcb7V-dKgn0 [https://perma.cc/U78K-KVPC].
34. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States
and the European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 878–79 (2014); see also Max, supra note 6.
35. Max, supra note 6; Schwartz & Solove, supra note 34, at 879.
36. See Christopher Wolf, Envisioning Privacy in the World of Big Data, in PRIVACY IN THE
MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, at 204, 208; see also Paul M. Schwartz &
Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841–45 (2011) (describing means by which data can become identifiable);
Soltani, supra note 9 (looking specifically at how information gathered via mobile analytics techniques
can become identifiable); Deborah Hurley, Taking the Long Way Home: The Human Right of Privacy
(explaining that the combination of the Internet of Things and nascent big data may make it challenging
to maintain anonymity), in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 17,
at 70, 76.
37. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 43; SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM
8 (2019); Altshuler, supra note 4.
38. ZUBOFF, supra note 37; Altshuler, supra note 4; see also Drew Harwell & Abha Bhattarai, Inside
Amazon Go: The Camera-Filled Convenience Store That Watches You Back, WASH. POST (Jan. 22,
2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/01/22/inside-amazon-go-thecamera-filled-convenience-store-that-watches-you-back/ [https://perma.cc/X5C8-P3B2] (examining the
cashierless Amazon Go store and explaining that powerful companies like Amazon have more than just
data on a shopper’s purchases—“‘they’re also connected with . . . nearly every aspect of [the shopper’s]
life,’ including where people live and what they buy, read and watch,” which all feed into a shopper’s
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Privacy advocates also argue that these superpowered profiles
open the door for automated discrimination, whereby shopper
profiles deemed most profitable receive tailored deals, different
pricing, and better service than consumers on the less profitable end
of the spectrum.39 Likewise, minorities and other groups could also
receive disparate treatment based on data collected. 40 Another big
concern is that as these technologies become more powerful, they
also become more inconspicuous or invisible to shoppers: they are
embedded in the phones they carry or in shelves, ceilings, and other
areas throughout the shopping experience. 41
B. Protections Under Current Privacy Laws
Despite changing societal norms and the advent of the
“oversharing economy,” or the “era of revelation,” there appears to
be a broad agreement that privacy is not a dead issue and still
deserves protection, according to privacy professor and expert Anita
Allen.42 However, as it stands, the Constitution does not explicitly
profile (quoting Danielle Citron, law professor at University of Maryland School of Law)).
39. TUROW, supra note 15, at 10–11.
40. See Emily Birnbaum, Key House Committee Offers Online Privacy Bill Draft, THE HILL (Dec.
18, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/475191-key-house-committee-offers-onlineprivacy-bill-draft [https://perma.cc/ZX5P-3X7B] (noting that the first draft of a bipartisan federal
privacy bill includes specific provisions “bar[ring] companies from using data in ways that result in
discrimination against minorities and other populations”).
41. See Terry, supra note 6; Soltani, supra note 9; see also NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 23
(“[T]he trend is toward systems of networked sensors that are so small as to be imperceptible by
humans, some on the nanoscale.” (citation omitted)); see also Hurley, supra note 36 (“Much
of . . . information activity will happen outside the limits of human sensory and temporal awareness.”);
Schneier, supra note 17 (noting that “ubiquitous surveillance is not only possible but cheap and easy”).
See
generally
How
it
Works,
RETAILNEXT,
https://retailnext.net/en/how-it-works/
[https://perma.cc/HTZ2-R7CC] (providing an example of the power of a retail analytics platform and
the wide variety of sources that can already be aggregated).
42. See Anita L. Allen, Lecture, What Must We Hide: The Ethics of Privacy and the Ethos of
Disclosure, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 1, 5, 18 (2012) (describing the “era of revelation” as an era
heavily influenced by technology and marked by individual preoccupation with “broadcasting what we
know, think, do, and feel” and noting a developing indifference to privacy); Toby Daniels, How
Overenthusiasm for Tech Led to an Era of Oversharing and Data, A DWEEK (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.adweek.com/performance-marketing/how-overenthusiasm-for-tech-led-to-an-era-ofoversharing-and-data-scandals/ (observing a shift in consumer infatuation with social media and
explaining how “[o]versharing became the new normal”); see also, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 3d 767, 776 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (rejecting vehemently Facebook’s views that social media users
cannot reasonably expect their personal information and communications to remain private, even after
sharing with friends, writing: “Facebook’s argument could not be more wrong”); Birnbaum, supra note
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grant a right to privacy, and neither a single plenary data protection
regulator nor a single definition of PII, which triggers the application
of privacy law, exists.43 Instead, privacy laws are largely a sectoral
hodgepodge of differing governmental views on consumers’ rights,
leaving several unregulated gaps. 44 At the federal level, for instance,
no law directly regulates data collection and use by companies such
as Facebook and Google, let alone brick-and-mortar retailers.45
Further, in comparison to the European Union and other
industrialized nations, privacy standards in the U.S. have been
described as “fragment[ed] and hollow,” providing few limits on data
collection, use, and disclosure. 46
Accordingly, the FTC, which stepped in to mitigate this void in the
early nineties, has become the broadest and most influential protector
of information privacy in the U.S.—more so than any privacy statute
40 (highlighting bipartisan support for a federal privacy bill). See generally Jeewon Kim Serrato et al.,
U.S. States Pass Data Protection Laws on the Heels of the GDPR, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT: DATA
PROT. REP. (July 9, 2018), https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/07/u-s-states-pass-dataprotection-laws-on-the-heels-of-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/7NX6-4J6S] (summarizing recent state
legislation expanding data protection).
43. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 238; Natasha Singer, The Government Protects Our Food and
Cars. Why Not Our Data?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/sundayreview/data-protection-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/L9MM-XW6R] (“The United States is virtually
the only developed nation without a comprehensive consumer data protection law and an independent
agency to enforce it.”); Doug Linder, The Right of Privacy, EXPLORING CONST. CONFLICTS,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html
[https://perma.cc/TH7WZEUA] (exploring in detail whether the Constitution protects the right to privacy); Schwartz & Solove,
supra note 36, at 1816, 1826–27 (arguing that PII is one of the most important concepts in privacy
regulation because numerous state and federal statutes rely on its distinction and share the basic
assumption that in the absence of PII, no privacy harm exists).
44. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 238; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11; see also Natasha Singer,
The Week in Tech: Why Californians Have Better Privacy Protections, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/technology/the-week-in-tech-why-californians-have-betterprivacy-protections.html [https://perma.cc/7RA4-HR57]. Privacy advocates criticize a “sectoral”
approach because they contend that there is no express right to privacy in the Constitution or legislation,
and privacy is thus viewed as a preference that may be lightly bartered off according to competitive free
market norms. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 237–38. Instead, privacy advocates tend to prefer an
“omnibus” approach because it is seen as recognizing privacy as a fundamental human right that cannot
be bartered off due to an overarching national commitment to privacy constraints detailed in legislation.
Id.
45. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11.
46. Id. at 586–87; Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and
International Rules in Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 23 n.82 (2000);
Singer, supra note 43; see also Hurley, supra note 36, at 74 (noting that, unlike other countries, the U.S.
has failed to keep up as information and communication technologies have advanced, leaving
Americans with fewer protections for their personal data).
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or common law tort.47 In fact, “[t]oday, the FTC is viewed as the de
facto federal data protection authority.”48 However, because the FTC
cannot practically set substantive privacy rules or generally impose
penalties unless an entity has violated an existing FTC order, it has
acted primarily as an enforcer, proceeding under a general grant of
authority grounded in section 5(a) of the FTC Act, which prohibits
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”49
Under this framework, a rich collection of over 500 enforcement
FTC actions related to consumer privacy have been likened to
privacy “common law” by Professors Daniel Solove and Woodrow
Hartzog.50 Moreover, the understanding of “unfair or deceptive acts”
has expanded to include not only a failure to comply with published
privacy promises, but also a general theory of deception with respect
to obtaining personal information and providing insufficient notice of

47. Marc Rotenberg, EPIC: The First Twenty Years (describing how the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), a privacy interest group, turned to the FTC to strengthen privacy regulation
amid a “patchwork of law . . . emerging in the United States in the early 1990s that seemed inefficient
and incoherent”), in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, at 10,
10–11; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11.
48. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 600. The FTC was originally created in 1914 with the intent
to “ensure fair competition in commerce,” but “[a]t the urging of Congress” and privacy interest groups
in 1995, “the FTC became involved with consumer privacy issues.” Id. at 598; Rotenberg, supra note
47, at 11; Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history
[https://perma.cc/BV6Y-DRKC].
49. 15 U.S.C. § 45; see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-wedo/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/FBL2-DV4D] (Oct. 2019); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY
& DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2017 (2018) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N 2017],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2017-overviewcommissions-enforcement-policy-initiatives-consumer/privacy_and_data_security_update_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WWJ3-UBC8]; Jessica Rich, Opinion, Give the F.T.C. Some Teeth to Guard Our
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/opinion/ftc-privacycongress.html [https://perma.cc/3LWM-RCZJ]. The FTC has investigative and enforcement tools and
broad jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 45, but with some significant limits to its power. § 45; Chris Jay
Hoofnagle et al., The FTC Can Rise to the Privacy Challenge, but Not Without Help from Congress,
BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/08/the-ftccan-rise-to-the-privacy-challenge-but-not-without-help-from-congress/
[https://perma.cc/XD8M9JDW]. The FTC cannot set broad, normative privacy standards and cannot impose penalties on
wrongdoers “unless they’re already under an order for [a] previous wrongdoing . . . .” Rich, supra.
50. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 619, 621, 622–23 (arguing that privacy-related settlements
the FTC issues are the functional equivalent of privacy common law, much like bodies of case law,
given their publicized nature, precedential treatment by privacy practitioners, and consistency); FED.
TRADE COMM’N 2017, supra note 49, at 2.
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invasive activities. 51 This privacy oversight is largely recognized as
the notice-and-choice regime and offers much counsel for online
practices.52
Notably absent from this oversight, however, is counsel within the
specific context of brick-and-mortar technology—to date, only one
FTC settlement has addressed in-store tracking.53 Without
prescriptive regulations, businesses face uncertainty in navigating
whether conduct falls within a safe harbor and are therefore forced to
interpret FTC actions and guidance for “compliance nuggets.”54
Questions as to the actual scope of the FTC’s powers have further
muddied the waters.55
Meanwhile, at the state level, most privacy and tort laws have
historically been ineffective at addressing these emerging digital
problems.56 But because of little progress made on a federal law,
many states have started taking matters into their own hands.57
51. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 627–43 (providing an in-depth analysis of FTC privacy
jurisprudence over “unfair or deceptive acts”).
52. See id. at 592.
53. Retail Tracking Firm Settles FTC Charges It Misled Consumers About Opt Out Choices, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Retail Tracking Firm], https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2015/04/retail-tracking-firm-settles-ftc-charges-it-misled-consumers
[https://perma.cc/E93M-BHE3] (“The complaint is the FTC’s first against a retail tracking company.”).
54. See William R. Denny, Cybersecurity As an Unfair Practice: FTC Enforcement Under Section 5
of
the
FTC
Act,
A.B.A.
(June
20,
2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/06/cyber_center_denny
[https://perma.cc/MC5P-2UUM].
55. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2019) (narrowing the
time frame that the FTC can investigate and bring cases under its section 13(b) powers by finding that
the FTC could not state a claim after a five-year gap had lapsed between when the alleged misconduct
ended and when the FTC filed its complaint).
56. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 587–88. Technology has outpaced conceptions of privacy
torts and foreclosed application against retail stores because courts remain unwilling to extend
expectations of privacy to public spaces and continue to find that privacy does not exist if the
information has been either exposed to the public or disclosed to others. Vincent Nguyen, Shopping for
Privacy: How Technology in Brick-and-Mortar Retail Stores Poses Privacy Risks for Shoppers, 29
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 535, 560–61 (2019).
57. Adam Stone, As Privacy Concerns Grow, States Create Bold Policies, GOV’T TECH. (July–Aug.
2019), https://www.govtech.com/policy/As-Privacy-Concerns-Grow-States-Create-Bold-Policies.html
[https://perma.cc/Y2RU-2BPM] (quoting Washington Senator Reuven Carlyle as saying that “the
federal government has made themselves functionally irrelevant,” and noting that rather than wait
anymore, Senator Carlyle and other state leaders are stepping up to assert control over the issue); Sarah
Rippy,
US
State
Comprehensive
Privacy
Law
Comparison,
IAPP,
https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ [https://perma.cc/B9QQ-E6SR] (Mar. 3, 2021);
Michael Beckerman, Americans Will Pay a Price for State Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019),
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California, in particular, has already developed one of the most
comprehensive privacy measures in the United States after the bill
raced through the state legislature with grudging support to avoid an
even tougher ballot initiative. 58 The CCPA essentially grants
consumers an exclusive right to privacy regarding all of their
personal information.59 Like the GDPR, which recognizes privacy
and the protection of personal data as fundamental human rights, the
CCPA provides strong protections for consumers.60 The recently
passed California Privacy Rights Act, which amends the CCPA and
takes effect in January 2023 with a “look back” to January 2022 for
enforcement purposes, expands protections even further.61
Without a national privacy law, the GDPR and the hastily passed
CCPA have become the new face of information privacy legislation,
with many states pushing to introduce mirror legislation. 62 However,
the costs of compliance and risk of error in navigating fifty unique
state laws along with any applicable federal and foreign laws could

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/opinion/state-privacy-laws.html [https://perma.cc/Z3B2-RKKN];
Grande, supra note 13; Bennett Cyphers, Big Tech’s Disingenuous Push for a Federal Privacy Law,
EFF (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/09/big-techs-disingenuous-push-federalprivacy-law [https://perma.cc/8XF4-8AWF].
58. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-law.html
[https://perma.cc/NN77-US3U] (“The bill raced through the State Legislature without opposition on
[June 28th] and was signed into law by Gov. Jerry Brown, just hours before a deadline to pull from the
November ballot an initiative seeking even tougher oversight over technology companies.”); Katelyn
Ringrose & Jeremy Greenberg, California Privacy Legislation: A Timeline of Key Events, FUTURE OF
PRIVACY
F.,
https://fpf.org/2020/07/01/california-privacy-legislation-a-timeline-of-key-events/
[https://perma.cc/Q4G7-Y6PQ] (Aug. 31, 2020) (showing by timeline the short window within which
legislators rushed to pass the CCPA to head off a stricter ballot initiative).
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020) (providing a right to request disclosure of personal
information collected); id. § 1798.105 (providing a right to request deletion of information collected);
id. §§ 1798.110, .115 (providing a right to request disclosure of personal information sold to third
parties); id. § 1798.120 (providing a right to request that personal information not be sold to third
parties); id. § 1798.140.
60. Wakabayashi, supra note 58.
61. See Michele Cohen, The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 Passed, Now What?, JD SUPRA
(Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-california-privacy-rights-act-of-57046/
[https://perma.cc/8JGE-2DMA].
62. See Wakabayashi, supra note 58 and accompanying text; Rippy, supra note 57; Stone, supra
note 57 (citing California Senator Bob Hertzberg describing the states stepping in on marijuana
legislation because of the size and slow-moving nature of the federal government as an apt analogy for
privacy rights); Grande, supra note 13. See generally Serrato et al., supra note 42.
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create a nightmare for some businesses.63 Multiple conflicting laws
would also create confusion and inconsistent outcomes for consumers
as they shop locally, online, and across the country. 64 Stricter online
protections also raise additional questions about how these laws
would apply to brick-and-mortar.65 In-store tracking technologies
remain unaddressed in current legislation and barely figure into
current debates, despite brick-and-mortar control of 84% of all retail
sales, even during the COVID-19 pandemic.66 As such, a dire need
for more uniform direction concerning information privacy exists,
particularly in the brick-and-mortar context.67
II. ANALYSIS
Thanks to pressure from the GDPR and the CCPA, for the first
time, there is a general consensus among Congress and both
consumer and business interest groups alike that a national privacy
law is well-founded.68 To this end, more than a dozen bills and
63. See generally Grande, supra note 13.
64. Beckerman, supra note 57.
65. See McKinnon, supra note 5; McDowell et al., supra note 15 (highlighting existing ambiguity as
to brick-and-mortar obligations); Andrew Burt, Why Privacy Regulations Don’t Always Do What
They’re Meant To, HARV. BUS. REV.: SEC. & PRIV. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/whyprivacy-regulations-dont-always-do-what-theyre-meant-to [https://perma.cc/GC4Z-RL9U] (explaining
that, in the context of the GDPR, a challenge with overly broad and generic regulations is that they treat
all organizations the same and fail to include explicit recommendations or specific prohibitions in a way
that is immediately clear for all companies).
66. TUROW, supra note 15; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., CB20-120, QUARTERLY
RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 2ND QUARTER 2020, at 2 tbl.1 (2020).
67. See generally Beckerman, supra note 57 (explaining that a patchwork of state laws are becoming
more convoluted, benefiting only lawyers and the data compliance industry); Grande, supra note 13
(highlighting growing businesses’ vulnerability to a complex and inconsistent regulatory environment
with increased state regulation); McDowell et al., supra note 15 (noting uncertainty as to whether
notice-and-choice applies in the brick-and-mortar context); Comment Letter from David French, Senior
Vice President, Nat’l Retail Fed’n, to David J. Redl, Assistant Sec’y for Commc’ns & Info., Nat’l
Telecomms. & Info. Admin. 3 (Nov. 9, 2019) [hereinafter NRF Comment Letter],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/nrf_comments_to_ntia_re_consumer_privacy_submitte
d_9_nov_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/85S9-VLWY] (emphasizing concern for the risk of misjudging
different state laws that brick-and-mortar stores absorb in trying to serve their customers).
68. Grande, supra note 13 (observing support from the business community, including the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, The Software Alliance, and tech giants such as Google, Microsoft, and Apple);
Rich, supra note 49 (highlighting the push for a broad, nationwide privacy standard among consumer
advocates, industry leaders, and the FTC since the late 1990s); Cyphers, supra note 57 (observing that
after years of fighting any kind of privacy legislation, big tech companies are now looking to the federal

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/10

18

Harripaul: Information Privacy

2021]

INFORMATION PRIVACY

1095

discussion drafts targeting more comprehensive online privacy
reform were circulated in the 116th Congress.69 To advance this
dialogue, other members of Congress, along with privacy advocacy
organizations and businesses, also offered model legislation drafts
and policy frameworks, and congressional committees held a handful
of privacy-related government hearings.70
Although none of these items individually may anticipate the
contents of a final federal act, collectively they mark the contours of
the chief issues moving into the next congressional session.
Accordingly, a review of these materials first reveals broad support
for increased consumer privacy protections beyond the current

government to save them from the states); Comment Letter from Nicholas R. Ahrens, Vice President of
Priv. & Cybersecurity, Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, to Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. (Nov. 9, 2018)
[hereinafter
RILA
Comment
Letter],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/rila_ntia_privacy_comment_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32NT-LRE7] (agreeing with the need for a uniform standard).
69. SAFE DATA Act, S. 4626, 116th Cong. (2020); Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3300, 116th
Cong. (2020); Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2020, S. 3456, 116th Cong. (2020);
Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019); Information Transparency &
Personal Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019); Online Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978,
116th Cong. (2019); Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214, 116th Cong. (2019); Mind Your Own Business
Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th Cong. (2019); ADD Act, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019); Social Media Privacy
Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019); DATA Privacy Act, S. 583,
116th Cong. (2019); BROWSER Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019); Birnbaum, supra note 40
(discussing that the House Energy and Commerce Committee circulated the discussion draft of
bipartisan federal privacy legislation); S. COMM. ON COM., SCI. & TRANSP., UNITED STATES CONSUMER
DATA PRIVACY ACT OF 2019 DISCUSSION DRAFT (2019) [hereinafter USCDPA],
https://aboutblaw.com/NaZ [https://perma.cc/V42B-LJ2H]; S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URB.
AFF.,
DATA
ACCOUNTABILITY
AND
TRANSPARENCY
ACT
OF
2020
(2020),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Brown%20%20DATA%202020%20Discussion%20Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC64-4ZUG].
70. See generally, e.g., Examining Legislative Proposals to Protect Consumer Data Privacy:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. (2019); Protecting Consumer
Privacy in the Era of Big Data: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Com. of the H. Comm.
on Energy & Com., 116th Cong. (2019); Legislation, INTEL [hereinafter Intel Legislation],
https://usprivacybill.intel.com/legislation [https://perma.cc/9HCL-NS5X]; Privacy for America Releases
Detailed Policy Framework to Provide Strong Data Privacy Protections for All Americans, PRIV. FOR
AMERICA (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.privacyforamerica.com/detailed-policy-framework-to-providestrong-data-privacy-protections/ [https://perma.cc/P434-TZFG]; SENATE DEMOCRATS, PRIVACY AND
DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK, https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Final_CMTE%20
Privacy%20Principles_11.14.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA7D-NP24] (outlining the Senate Democratic
leaders privacy principles); CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., CDT FEDERAL BASELINE PRIVACY
LEGISLATION DISCUSSION DRAFT (Dec. 5, 2018) [hereinafter CDT FEDERAL BASELINE],
https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-12-12-CDT-Privacy-Discussion-Draft-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CJF4-FGU3].
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notice-and-choice model.71 A closer look, however, specifically at
the bills and proposals introduced in the 116th Congress, betrays
bipartisan consensus on several key issues.
For example, most congressional members agree on the need for a
federal privacy regulator. 72 Although some would appoint the FTC,
others are unconvinced of the FTC’s fitness, perhaps siding with
critics on the FTC’s “inadequacy and toothlessness” and past of
“rampant regulatory overreach” when it held broad authority to issue
substantive rules. 73 The bills and proposals would also generally
minimize data collection and put information safeguards in place. 74
Additionally, despite PII’s conceptual problems, lawmakers in the
116th Congress widely agreed that some concept of PII is necessary
moving forward.75
More significantly, a number of the bills and proposals approach
privacy reform by concentrating on strengthening consumer control
of data, similar to the CCPA, albeit with variances on the types of
71. See, e.g., S. 3300, § 2 (noting that increasing digitalization of information has magnified the
harm to individual privacy and as such it is necessary for Congress to act); Fact Sheet: Chairman
Wicker’s Discussion Draft the United States Consumer Data Privacy Act, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON COM.
SCI. & TRANSP. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/12/chairman-wicker-sdiscussion-draft-the-united-states-consumer-data-privacy-act
[https://perma.cc/J2XM-56WX]
(explaining that the twenty-first-century American economy is increasingly driven by data, leading to
numerous high-profile misuses of data, for which consumers have demanded Congress step in); SENATE
DEMOCRATS, supra note 70 (emphasizing that basic legal frameworks protecting privacy have not
evolved to meet the new reality of technology and data collection); see also Cameron F. Kerry, Breaking
Down Proposals for Privacy Legislation: How Do They Regulate?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/breaking-down-proposals-for-privacy-legislation-how-do-theyregulate/ [https://perma.cc/L6YJ-DQL2] (showing that notice-and-choice is widely viewed as
insufficient among privacy mavens).
72. See S. 2637, § 8 (creating a “Bureau of Technology” within the FTC); S. 142, § 5 (naming the
FTC as the federal privacy regulator); S. 3456, § 9 (naming the FTC as the federal privacy regulator);
Birnbaum, supra note 40 (creating a bureau within the FTC). But see S. 3300, § 4(a) (establishing a
“Data Protection Agency” instead); H.R. 4978, § 301 (establishing an independent “United States
Digital Privacy Agency” instead).
73. See Ryan Moshell, And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States
Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 383
(2005); Alex Propes, Privacy & FTC Rulemaking Authority: A Historical Context, IAB (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.iab.com/news/privacy-ftc-rulemaking-authority-a-historical-context/
[https://perma.cc/MF3R-BLCS].
74. See, e.g., S. 3456 §§ 3(d), 6 (including specific data minimization and data security provisions);
S. 2968 §§ 106, 107 (same); H.R. 4978, §§ 201, 214 (same); S. 1214 §§ 12, 13; USCDPA, supra note
69, at 10–11, 17–18 (same).
75. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1828; see also, e.g., S. 3300 § 3(5); S. 3456 § 2(9); S.
2968 § 2(8); S. 2637 § 2(12); H.R. 4978 § 2(13).
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controls given to consumers. 76 This approach contrasts with the
business accountability approach that businesses and organizations
advanced in their policy frameworks and in the provisions of drafts
like the United States Consumer Data Privacy Act (USCDPA).77
Notably, the deceptively subtle differences between these two
approaches could present very different outcomes for
brick-and-mortar tracking technologies. 78
Perhaps the biggest privacy reform battles in the 116th Congress,
however, took shape in a category privacy expert Cameron Kerry
labeled as “end game issues,” which he argues “are too politically
charged to resolve without a clear picture of the substance of privacy
protection in a bill.”79 These issues include private rights of action
and preemption of state laws.80 Preemption is of particular concern in
brick-and-mortar privacy rhetoric.81
A. The Current Notice-and-Choice Regime
When the FTC first stepped onto the privacy scene in 1995, it
embraced the existing scheme of industry self-regulation out of “fear
that regulation would stifle the growth of online activity.”82 Under
this scheme, businesses essentially determined for themselves the
basic rules they would adhere to regarding data collection, use, and

76. See sources cited supra note 59; see also S. 2968 §§ 102–05, 204(b) (providing a private right of
action and base consumer rights of access, correction, deletion, portability, and information); H.R. 4978
§§ 102–09, 407 (providing the same with additional consumer rights of human review of automated
decisions, information, impermanence, and individual autonomy); S. 3456 §§ 4–5 (providing individual
consumer rights of access, portability, and information but no private right of action); S. 1214 §§ 4–6,
17 (providing a private right of action and base consumer rights); USCDPA, supra note 69, at 7–10
(providing base consumer rights but no private right of action).
77. See CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70; Intel Legislation, supra note 70; USCDPA, supra
note 69; see also Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,600,
48,600–01 (Sept. 26, 2018) (proposing a shift away from mandating notice-and-choice to focusing on
outcomes of organizational practices in 2018).
78. See generally discussion infra Section II.B.
79. Cameron F. Kerry, Game On: What to Make of Senate Privacy Bills and Hearing, BROOKINGS:
TECHTANK (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12/03/game-on-what-tomake-of-senate-privacy-bills-and-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/8799-TAQE].
80. Id.
81. NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67; RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 3.
82. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 598.
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disclosure; businesses then stated the rules in privacy policies.83 This
self-regulatory privacy regime has largely continued under the FTC
but now “with some oversight,” relying on notice and choice as key
aspects of enforcement.84
The use of privacy policies arose out of the Fair Information
Practices (FIPs), first stated in a 1973 U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) report and later expanded by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in its 1980 privacy guidelines. 85 The HEW report emerged as a
response to the widespread use of automated data systems containing
personal information, like social security numbers, in both the public
and private sectors. 86 Individuals’ right to notice about the collection
and use of their data, and right to consent to this collection and use,
were two of the most prominent FIPs and thus “became the backbone
of the U.S. self-regulatory approach.”87
1. FTC “Common Law”
Initially, FTC oversight consisted mainly of adding some teeth to
privacy policies, most of which lacked any penalty or consequence if
a company failed to live up to its promises. 88 This oversight has since
grown into some general parameters around the notice-and-choice
requirement.89 Vague language, technically correct but incomplete
language, and language hidden in dense boilerplate policies have all
been deemed insufficient for notice purposes.90
Further, even if no notice is given, and thus no promise is broken,
the FTC has taken a stance against surreptitious consumer

83. Id.
84. Id. at 592, 604.
85. Id. at 592. See generally Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information Practices, WORLD
PRIV. F., https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-a-brief-introduction-to-fair-informatio
n-practices/ [https://perma.cc/43LZ-P9JB] (Dec. 19, 2007) (discussing the FIPs of the HEW report and a
list of the eight expanded principles codified in the OECD Guidelines of 1980).
86. Hoofnagle, supra note 4.
87. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 592–93.
88. Id. at 604.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 634–36.
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surveillance online.91 In In re Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc., the FTC
found that installing spyware and gathering data without notice was
an unfair practice.92 Although the FTC did not allege in its complaint
that Aspen Way made any privacy-related promises, the FTC deemed
the surreptitious data gathering unfair due to the substantial harm
caused to consumers from such invasive surveillance and concerns
that “[c]onsumers [could not] reasonably avoid these injuries because
[the surveillance was] invisible to them.”93
In the specific context of brick-and-mortar tracking, the FTC has
handled only one case.94 In In re Nomi Technologies, Inc., the FTC
found that shopper tracking in brick-and-mortar can also be deceptive
if consumers are not adequately informed of these activities.95
Specifically, the FTC found that Nomi’s representations in its privacy
policies that consumers were “always” allowed to opt-out of its
mobile tracking services were deceptive because an opt-out
mechanism was available online but not in-store and because
consumers were given no notice that they were being tracked at a
retail location.96
However, several issues take shape in In re Nomi.97 Although
Nomi failed to offer an in-store opt-out as promised in its privacy
policy, Nomi was not even required to offer such an option because it
did not collect PII. 98 Yet, for this single misstatement, which went
beyond minimum standards, the FTC gave Nomi (a small,
two-year-old start-up) the same punishment as Facebook (a
91. Id. at 641.
92. See Complaint at 4, In re Aspen Way Enters., Inc., FTC File No. 112-3151 (F.T.C. Apr. 11,
2013) (No. C-4392) [hereinafter Aspen Complaint]; see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 641.
93. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 641 (quoting Aspen Complaint, supra note 92, at 2).
94. Retail Tracking Firm, supra note 53.
95. Complaint at 2–3, In re Nomi Techs., Inc., FTC File No. 132-3251 (F.T.C. Aug. 28, 2015) (No.
C-4538).
96. Id.
97. See generally Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In re Nomi, FTC File
No. 132-3251 (F.T.C. Sept. 12, 2015) (No. C-4538) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement of Commissioner
Wright]; Tim Sparapani, Privacy and Security Innovation: The Cautionary Tale of Nomi Technologies
and
the
FTC,
FORBES
(May
26,
2015,
11:46
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timsparapani/2015/05/26/privacy-and-security-innovation-the-cautionarytale-of-nomi-technologies-and-the-ftc/#64b31d9b4a38 [https://perma.cc/77K4-6C56].
98. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright, supra note 97, at 1 (explaining that Nomi neither
tracked individual consumers nor identified them); Sparapani, supra note 97.
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multibillion-dollar company) despite little, if any, economic
consumer injury.99
2. Implications for Brick-and-Mortar
The puzzling result in In re Nomi reflects an immediate need for
greater penalty gradations and for more definition as to what
constitutes an “injury” outside of economic harms.100 More
importantly, it also highlights deeper issues concerning the
practicality of the notice-and-choice regime and the FTC’s intention
to apply it to in-store technologies, given that the FTC did not order
any affirmative notice-and-choice obligations.101
The In re Nomi decision is also particularly troubling given
brick-and-mortar retail’s painful three-dimensional constraints that
significantly stunt speed-to-market.102 For example, a simple graphic
update on a merchandising display involves meticulous planning and
project management to ensure the signage is printed, shipped, and
installed in compliance with merchandising standards.103 Depending
on the company’s approval process, the number of stores and
differing store layouts, and the complexity of the project, this process
could take weeks. 104 As such, it is unsurprising that bigger

99. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright, supra note 97, at 4 (describing Nomi’s failure as
a “minor shortcoming” and stating that “there [was] no evidence the misrepresentation harmed
consumers”); Sparapani, supra note 97.
100. See Sparapani, supra note 97.
101. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright, supra note 97, at 1 (pointing out that even if the
facts of the In re Nomi case did support a technical violation, prosecutorial discretion favored restraint);
McDowell et al., supra note 15 (noting that the FTC’s approach in In re Nomi “raises the question of
whether the FTC would ever impose a notice and choice obligation for offline, retail tracking” and
provides “no certainty around the FTC’s view”); Sparapani, supra note 97 (hypothesizing that the
effects of the In re Nomi order are “likely” to extend to all businesses).
102. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 29.
103. See A Guide to Retail Print Graphics, THE VOMELA COS., https://info.vomela.com/guide-toretail-print-graphics-windows-walls-floors?_ga=2.147550967.1931912370.16084217841571079601.1608421784 [https://perma.cc/G83V-W8WS].
104. See,
e.g.,
THE
VOMELA
COS.,
PETCO
DOG
TREAT
PROJECT
2,
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/1689179/Case%20Studies/Petco/VOM-MKT_Petco_Case-Study_V2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5B8W-DE9W] (detailing a case study on how updating simple merchandising graphics
across 1,400 Petco stores took four weeks, not including the approval process).
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store-of-the-future concepts are tested in innovation labs, with
rollouts taking place years later. 105
Looking specifically at in-store tracking technologies, a national
rollout, along with shipping and installation, requires mapping
analytics objectives against measurable key performance indicators
of the technology.106 It also includes numerous site visits to
understand differing store layouts, determine hardware placement,
evaluate adaptions for legacy systems, and test the technology. 107 In
this challenging three-dimensional store environment, a lack of
certainty and fear of facing government fines or penalties inhibits
already slow adoption and growth rates in innovative technologies,
during a very competitive time.108 Although FTC oversight and the
notice-and-choice regime have offered some aid for companies
wrestling with data innovation and privacy, much uncertainty still
remains for brick-and-mortar.109
B. Moving Beyond Notice-and-Choice
As the notice-and-choice regime continues to receive scrutiny, two
key regulatory approaches appear in information privacy reform
discussions: one focusing on consumer control and one focusing on
business accountability. 110
105. Ruff, supra note 22 (describing how big-box home improvement retailer Lowe’s created its
innovation lab in 2015 to test concepts that rolled out several years later). The cashierless Amazon Go
store offers another example of the timing and difficulty associated with a larger store-of-the-future
rollout—the new store was announced in December 2016 with plans to open to the public in “early
2017,” but due to “kinks” with the technology, the opening was ultimately pushed back almost a year.
Laura Stevens, Amazon Delays Opening of Cashierless Store to Work Out Kinks, WALL ST. J.: TECH
(Mar. 27, 2017, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-delays-convenience-store-openingto-work-out-kinks-1490616133 [https://perma.cc/H94L-EC6Q]; Matt Day, Amazon Go Cashierless
Convenience
Store
Opens
to
the
Public
in
Seattle,
SEATTLE
TIMES,
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/amazon-go-cashierless-convenience-store-opening-tothe-public/ [https://perma.cc/7GZE-WA4M] (Jan. 22, 2018, 9:54 PM).
106. See WALKBASE, supra note 7, at 17–20.
107. Id.
108. See NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67, at 4.
109. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright, supra note 97, at 4 (explaining that the
aggressive prosecution of Nomi “[sent] a dangerous message to [businesses] weighing the costs and
benefits of voluntarily providing information and choice to consumers”); McDowell et al., supra note
15; Sparapani, supra note 97; McKinnon, supra note 5.
110. See Kerry, supra note 71 (making a similar finding and referencing the two privacy models as
consumer choice and business behavior); see also GDPR & CCPA: Opt-Ins, Consumer Control, and the
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1. Consumer Control Approach
The idea behind the first approach to privacy reform, followed by a
number of privacy bills and proposals before the 116th Congress, is
that the appropriate response to increased data pooling is increased
consumer control of data. 111 Advocates flock to this property-style
model because it is seen as offering consumers the greatest
protections and recognizing privacy more or less as a fundamental
right.112 This is the premise behind the GDPR, the CCPA, the CPRA,
and bills like the Data Protection Act of 2020 and the Consumer
Online Privacy Rights Act. 113
Under this approach, privacy cannot be left to self-regulation when
businesses have such substantial profit incentives.114 These models
attempt to place consumers squarely in the driver’s seat with
exclusive control of their personal data, frequently including some
form of a private right of action (PRA) for consumers.115

Impact on Competition and Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3–4
(2019) (statement of Jane Bambauer, Professor of Law, University of Arizona) [hereinafter Bambauer
Statement] (referencing a property model and a harm- or risk-based approach).
111. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 3. See generally Press Release, Sen. Maria Cantwell,
Cantwell, Senate Democrats Unveil Strong Online Privacy Rights (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cantwell-senate-democrats-unveil-strong-onlineprivacy-rights [https://perma.cc/T98G-MGVL].
112. See generally Press Release, supra note 111; Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 3.
113. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 3; S. 3300, 116th Cong. (2020); see also California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST.: OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa [https://perma.cc/LUD8-NBA3]; Letter from Alastair Mactaggart to
Initiative Coordinator, California Off. of the Att’y Gen. (Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Mactaggart Letter],
https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/19-0021A1%20%28Consumer%20Privacy%20%20Version%203%29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ6U-MVSJ].
114. See Mactaggart Letter, supra note 113; see also Lily Hay Newman, Never Trust a Platform to
Put Privacy Ahead of Profit, WIRED: SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2019, 2:32 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/twitter-two-factor-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/FFF3-RDZ7] (using
examples of several big companies pulling phone numbers and other data used for two-factor
authentication into their marketing databases to show that big companies are not prioritizing user
privacy and security ahead of their business goals, despite having the resources to easily control and
protect this data).
115. See Press Release, supra note 111; Kerry, supra note 71; Bambauer Statement, supra note 110,
at 3; see also, e.g., S. 1214, 116th Cong. § 17(a)(1) (2019) (“Any individual alleging a violation . . . may
bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction.”); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S.
2968, 116th Cong. § 301(c)(1) (2019) (“Any individual alleging a violation . . . may bring a civil action
in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West
2020) (authorizing consumers to bring civil suits for statutory damages).
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Many of these models continue to rely heavily on notice and
consent before or during collection of PII, with limited
exemptions.116 The CPRA has gone so far as to require that any
consent given must be “freely given, specific, informed and
unambiguous,” and one bill requires affirmative consent even for
aggregated personal information used for behavioral personalization,
offering an exemption only for the strict purpose of increasing
usability for the benefit of the consumer. 117
Additionally, although one bill proposed setting a minimum
percentage of individuals who must read and understand a notice or
consent process, the bill, like its counterparts, fails to address
problematic privacy policy and notice-delivery mechanisms in any
meaningful way.118 Instead, the bills and proposals focus on arming
consumers with a core set of individual rights, such as the rights of
access, correction, deletion, portability, and information.119
In defining PII, these models lean toward a more expansive
definition. A number of the bills and proposals defined PII as
information “linked or reasonably linkable” to an individual or
device.120 According to Professors Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove,
this broad standard allows for flexibility in adapting to new
technological developments, unlike provisions that merely enumerate
116. Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin, Hitting Refresh on Privacy Policies: Recommendations for
Notice
and
Transparency,
BROOKINGS:
TECHTANK
(Jan.
6,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/01/06/hitting-refresh-on-privacy-policiesrecommendations-for-notice-and-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/5QUQ-37CC]; see also, e.g., Online
Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978, 116th Cong. § 212 (2019); Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of
2020, S. 3456, 116th Cong. § 3(b); S. 2968 §§ 102(b), 105(b)–(c) (2019).
117. Mactaggart Letter, supra note 113, at 22; H.R. 4978 §§ 106(b), (d).
118. See, e.g., H.R. 4978 § 213(d) (providing only that notice “shall be (A) clear and in plain
language; and (B) made publicly available in a prominent location on an ongoing basis . . . [and] shall be
made available . . . before any collection of personal information”).
119. See, e.g., H.R. 4978 §§ 101–107; S. 3456 §§ 4, 5.
120. See, e.g., H.R. 4978 § 2(13)(A)–(B) (defining PII as “any information maintained by a covered
entity that is linked or reasonably linkable to a specific individual or a specific device, including
de-identified personal information” (emphasis added)); S. 3456 § 2(9)(A), (C) (defining PII as
“information that identifies or is linked or reasonably linkable to a specific individual” (emphasis
added)); S. 3300 § 3(5) (defining PII as “any information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable
of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular
individual or device,” including “inferences drawn from any of [this] information . . . to create a profile
about an individual reflecting the individual’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends,
predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes” (emphasis added)).

Published by Reading Room, 2021

27

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 10

1104

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

a list of specific types of information, which can be too restrictive to
adequately protect data. 121
However, because this broader definition employed by lawmakers
does not account for PII’s flexible nature and because the boundaries
of PII versus non-PII are still unknown, businesses contend that they
are burdened with the risk of interpreting PII’s tricky boundaries.122
According to Schwartz and Solove, businesses are also asked to
endeavor in counterintuitive practices, given that they must build
processes to link reasonably linkable information to satisfy individual
rights like access, correction, and portability. 123 And this feat
becomes even more difficult and complex when a bill bans this
identification process.124
Critics also note that this approach is too onerous, posing
substantial initial and ongoing compliance costs that could have a
disparate impact on businesses. 125 Under California’s CCPA, for
example, nonprofits and businesses with annual revenues under $25
million are exempt from data protection requirements, even though
the sensitivity of the data collected and the consequences of
compromise are the same. 126 Meanwhile, one report has already
found that companies subject to the requirements may have to pay up
to $55 billion in initial compliance costs as a result of the CCPA
alone.127
Likewise, a laundry list of unlimited consumer rights may also
pose some unintended consequences. Data portability, for example,

121. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1829, 1832, 1871–72.
122. Id. at 1829 (noting that these types of definitions are unhelpful for distinguishing PII from
non-PII); see also RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2.
123. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1876–77.
124. See, e.g., H.R. 4978 § 206.
125. NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67, at 3; see also James Campbell et al., Privacy Regulation
and Market Structure, 24 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 47, 47, 49 (2015) (demonstrating that
compliance costs from privacy regulation will disproportionately burden smaller firms and new firms
and proposing that “the impact on market structure should be an important part of the discussion on
privacy regulation”).
126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (West 2020).
127. Lauren Feiner, California’s New Privacy Law Could Cost Companies a Total of $55 Billion to
Get in Compliance, CNBC: TECH, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/05/california-consumer-privacy-actccpa-could-cost-companies-55-billion.html [https://perma.cc/4JTD-39UV] (Oct. 8, 2019, 10:38 AM).
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could breed anticompetitive outcomes.128 And more importantly,
requirements like right of access and data portability, which require a
business to collect all information related to an individual and
produce a record of it, risk a new and formidable privacy threat—an
individual’s entire data profile could be fraudulently requested and
used to harm the individual. 129
Finally, a significant critique of the consumer control approach is
that it places “too much of [a] burden on individual[] [consumers] to
manage their [own] privacy.”130 To exercise control, consumers are
tasked with upgrading their digital literacy and monitoring their data
for each business interaction, as data collection “becom[es] more
sophisticated and less transparent every day.”131 However, research
actually reveals that consumers do not read or understand privacy
policies, are heavily influenced by the way choice is framed, and
harbor many preexisting and incorrect assumptions about what
policies protect.132 As such, congressional members like New Jersey
Representative Frank Pallone (D), Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker
(R), and Washington Senator Maria Cantwell (D) have all labeled
privacy policies as “unrealistic and unfair,” “lengthy and confusing,”
and “no longer enough,” respectively.133

128. RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2.
129. See generally JAMES PAVUR & CASEY KNERR, BLACKHAT, GDPARRRRR: USING PRIVACY LAWS
TO STEAL IDENTITIES (2019), https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Thursday/us-19-Pavur-GDPArrrrr-UsingPrivacy-Laws-To-Steal-Identities-wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YAR-56G3].
130. Kerry, supra note 71 (noting that though consumer control, namely “[g]reater transparency and
individual decision-making,” certainly “[has] a place in comprehensive privacy legislation,” consumer
control approaches “are far from sufficient in a digital environment in which control is so elusive” and
put “too much of the burden on individuals to manage their privacy protection”).
131. James P. Nehf, The FTC’s Proposed Framework for Privacy Protection Online: A Move Toward
Substantive Controls or Just More Notice and Choice?, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1727, 1734–43
(2011) (providing several reasons why consumers are not capable of protecting their own privacy); see
also Altshuler, supra note 4; Zarsky, supra note 19 (arguing that a majority of consumers are
disinterested in managing the particulars of their personal information).
132. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883–88 (2013) (describing cognitive and structural problems that consumers
have with privacy self-management). According to a recent study, only around “one-in-five adults
overall say they always . . . or often . . . read a company’s privacy policy before agreeing to it,” with
only 22% of adults who ever read a privacy policy saying they read it all the way. Auxier et al., supra
note 19.
133. Kerry & Chin, supra note 116 (first quoting New Jersey Representative Frank Pallone; then
quoting Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker; and then quoting Washington Senator Maria Cantwell).
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2. Business Accountability Approach
The second approach to privacy reform shifts the responsibility of
protecting privacy from consumers to the businesses that hold their
data.134 Rather than focusing on consumer ownership of data, this
second approach focuses on business conduct and what happens to
the data once it is collected. 135
Because “overly prescriptive [models] can result in compliance
checklists that stymie innovative privacy solutions,” some of these
types of proposals offer more flexible behavioral standards.136 These
standards allow for flexibility in developing solutions based on a
business’s particular circumstances, in contrast to strict,
one-size-fits-all rules.137 For example, Intel proposed legislation that
includes a general duty of care “to take reasonable . . . measures not
to intentionally process personal data in a manner that would have
the reasonably foreseeable consequence of directly causing a natural
person to suffer significant physical injury or unmerited . . . financial
loss.”138
Moreover, although consumers may still be given various rights to
their data under this approach, these rights are generally limited when
they become unduly burdensome or create impracticability for
businesses.139 For example, the Center for Democracy and
Technology put forth draft privacy legislation that allows for the right
134. See Kerry, supra note 71; SENATE DEMOCRATS, supra note 70, at 2 (calling for “real
accountability” by shifting “the responsibility and liability of protecting privacy from consumers, who
are overly burdened with understanding complicated, take-it-or-leave-it privacy policies, to the entities
that hold their data and their senior corporate executives”).
135. See Kerry, supra note 71.
136. See Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,600,
48,600–01 (Sept. 26, 2018) (differentiating between strict, principle-based approaches, like models that
mandate notice and choice, and those that focus on organizational practices without dictating what the
practices should be).
137. See id.
138. Intel Legislation, supra note 70; see also Kerry, supra note 71 (analyzing the implications of this
duty of care).
139. See CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70, at 2–4 (providing a right of data portability only
“[w]here technically feasible”; a right of deletion, along with a list of exceptions, such as if fulfillment
would create a legitimate risk to privacy; and a right of correction within limited situations); Intel
Legislation, supra note 70 (proposing consumers have “reasonable access to . . . personal data” and
“reasonable obscurity of personal data” where it “is likely to create significant privacy risk to the
individual that is disproportionate to the public benefit”).
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of correction but limits this right to situations where the data is health
information, or it could be used for an eligibility determination or
educational opportunity.140
Another hallmark of this approach is the use of accountability
mechanisms that place the burden of ensuring compliance on the
businesses and senior executives who hold consumer data, rather than
on the consumer.141 For example, one bill provides for businesses to
designate a privacy officer, a data security officer, and internal
controls to ensure that senior management is involved in risk
assessment.142 The FTC’s routine practice of investigating and
charging individual executives of small firms for privacy violations
to motivate other executives to ensure compliance is also illustrative
of this point.143 Accordingly, rather than advocating for private rights
of action, this second approach proposes stronger enforcement,
navigated through more capable backstops like state attorneys
general, in addition to a federal privacy enforcer. 144
In defining PII, these models largely replicate definitions existing
in consumer control models, but they appear to make greater
allowances for uses of aggregated data. 145 However, unlike many
consumer control bills and proposals, this second approach places
emphasis on transparency and makes some departure from notions of
consent, with one proposal by the Center for Democracy and
Technology specifically outlining unfair data process practices.146
140. CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70, at 2–3.
141. See USCDPA, supra note 69, at 19. See generally CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70
(providing obligations of covered entities regarding personal information and outlining prohibited
categories of data use except as necessary to deliver specific features or services).
142. See USCDPA, supra note 69, at 19.
143. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Chopra, supra note 3, at 11, 19 (finding that there is
precedent for the FTC to charge individual officers and hold them personally liable and dissenting on
the release of CEO Mark Zuckerberg and other executives, counseling that, like executives at small
companies who are “routinely” charged, they should be held accountable); Dissenting Statement of
Commissioner Slaughter, supra note 3, at 6, 14.
144. USCDPA, supra note 69, at 20–22.
145. Compare USCDPA, supra note 69, at 2–3 (excluding aggregated, de-identified data from the
definition of covered data), with S. 3300, 116th Cong. § 3(5) (2020) (including “inferences drawn” from
any linked or reasonably linkable information “to create a profile about an individual reflecting the
individual’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes,
intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes” within the definition of covered data).
146. CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70, at 10–12.
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Notably, business accountability models were less popular than
consumer control models in the 116th Congress. But experts attribute
this adoption rate to difficulties in formalizing standards and the
obvious political appeal of models that appear to give consumers full
control.147 Elements of business behavior are also beginning to
appear in consumer control models. 148 Nonetheless, as digitalization
of information magnifies the harm to individual privacy, critics
demand that corporate titans, concerned only with their bottom lines,
must be checked.149
III. PROPOSAL
Discussions surrounding information privacy reform boil down to
two key competing interests: the need to secure consumers’ personal
information and the need to preserve technological innovation and
business competitiveness. 150 Long-running, irreconcilable differences
have shown that no solution will elegantly resolve these competing
interests.151 Additionally, the ever-expanding universe of issues
dealing with information privacy and the remarkable diversity among
the industries and businesses being regulated give hope for a
one-size-fits-all band-aid even less promising.152
As such, focusing first on smaller federal acts targeting some of
the bigger gaps and outliers, like brick-and-mortar analytics
technologies, could be one way to finally gain some traction. 153
Recent events, including a string of data breaches, the passage of
strict privacy laws in Europe and California, and pressure from

147. See Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 6.
148. Kerry, supra note 71.
149. See generally Press Release, supra note 111.
150. Altshuler, supra note 4.
151. See sources cited supra note 13; David McCabe, Congress and Trump Agreed They Want a
National Privacy Law. It Is Nowhere in Sight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/technology/national-privacy-law.html
[https://perma.cc/L52MSVD2] (noting that back in 2019 in a “rare” moment, Republicans and Democrats in Congress were all
in agreement that a national privacy law is warranted, but “a national privacy law is nowhere in sight”).
152. See Kerry, supra note 13.
153. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
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consumers, have renewed interest in a federal privacy law and may
have created the perfect incubator for its passage. 154
A. A Uniform Privacy Landscape
Under current U.S. information privacy protections, neither
consumers nor businesses are afforded any assurances in navigating
today’s challenging and evolving privacy landscape.155 In response to
delayed federal action, state governments are moving to pick up the
privacy torch.156 Without some uniformity, however, movement on
information privacy reform could crush companies doing business in
more than one state and subject them to the effects of disparate and
incomprehensible laws that could change each year. 157 The price tag
on California’s new privacy law has already been estimated at $55
billion, and price tags like this across the United States could wreak
havoc for businesses and risk the United States ceding its position as
a technology leader.158
High compliance costs from state laws would also impact
businesses disparately. Instead of disrupting the concerning data
practices of corporate giants like Facebook and Google, these
burdens could actually be most detrimental for smaller businesses. 159
154. Birnbaum, supra note 40 (noting efforts to develop a bipartisan federal privacy bill); Rich, supra
note 68; Daniel R. Stoller & Ben Brody, New FTC Powers Weighed in Senate Data Privacy Hearing,
BLOOMBERG L.: PRIV. & DATA SEC. L. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019, 2:28 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/new-ftc-powers-weighed-in-senate-dataprivacy-hearing-1 [https://perma.cc/5KLT-NUSV].
155. See Beckerman, supra note 57; Kerry & Chin, supra note 116.
156. Serrato et al., supra note 42. As of March 2018, all fifty U.S. states, as well as the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, have already enacted legislation to expand
data breach notification rules, including an expanded definition of personal information, to mirror some
of the protections the GDPR provides. Id.; Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/77FB-HUNC].
157. Beckerman, supra note 57; see also Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 2 (explaining the
significant effects on the economy likely to occur with the passage of just the CCPA). See generally
Campbell et al., supra note 125.
158. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 2 (asserting that “after a painful transition phase, the
[CCPA] will cause long-term drag on innovation,” which should provide reason for pause given that
“[t]he tech sector is the crown jewel of the U.S. economy”—it is “the greatest source of productivity
growth, [and] it also produces jobs and raises wages faster than any other industry”); Feiner, supra note
127; NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67; Beckerman, supra note 57.
159. See generally Ivana Kottasová, These Companies Are Getting Killed by GDPR, CNN: BUSINESS
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In practice, these costs could force smaller businesses to close shop,
wiping out the competition for and further concentrating personal
information in the hands of the big players. 160 “And even after a
painful transition phase, [these laws] will cause long-term drag on
innovation.”161
This result is particularly irreconcilable given that the very
consumers these laws serve to protect would also be victims of this
patchwork of state laws. Because data protection would necessarily
depend on the criteria chosen by the states to trigger compliance,
personal data still would not be protected comprehensively. 162 Thus,
consumers would be given a false sense of security concerning the
strength of privacy protections and encounter little legal certainty or
predictability.163
Additionally, consumers could also face increased costs as
businesses shift these expenses onto their products and services. And
because businesses might be less inclined to act in certain areas for
fear of risking penalties, consumers would likely forfeit many of the
conveniences and benefits they have come to expect thanks to
innovative uses of data. 164 As such, a uniform privacy landscape
appears most beneficial for both consumers and businesses. 165
Although advocates fear that preempting state laws will dilute
stronger consumer protections, preemption would apply only to
inconsistent state laws confined to the limited context of

(May 11, 2018, 6:39 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11/technology/gdpr-tech-companieslosers/index.html [https://perma.cc/6QN7-X92H] (describing the fatal impact of the cost of complying
on smaller businesses in the context of the GDPR); Campbell et al., supra note 125, at 47; Feiner, supra
note 127.
160. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 2. See generally Kottasová, supra note 159; Campbell et
al., supra note 125; Feiner, supra note 127.
161. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 2.
162. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (West 2020) (denying protections to the data of nonprofits
and businesses if those organizations have annual revenues under $25 million dollars or meet other
similar criteria).
163. Beckerman, supra note 57. According to a Pew Research study, there is already a “general lack
of understanding about data privacy laws” among consumers, with 63% stating that “they understand
very little or nothing at all about the laws and regulations that are currently in place to protect their data
privacy.” Auxier et al., supra note 19.
164. NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67.
165. See generally Beckerman, supra note 57.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/10

34

Harripaul: Information Privacy

2021]

INFORMATION PRIVACY

1111

brick-and-mortar.166 Further, a federal law could actually provide
stronger, more comprehensive protections that eliminate gaps in state
laws and issues with patchwork compliance. 167
B. A Targeted Brick-and-Mortar Technology Privacy Act
Concern for brick-and-mortar is well-founded given retail’s
importance to the U.S. economy with a gross domestic product
contribution of around $3.9 trillion of the annual total of $21.43
trillion.168 Despite all of the attention legislators and academics
continue to give online privacy, online retail transactions constitute
around only 11% of all U.S. retail sales—with brick-and-mortar
controlling the rest, totaling approximately $3.38 trillion. 169 Further,
although online and brick-and-mortar retailers both seek to improve
and personalize the shopping experience through analytics
technologies, in practice information privacy laws that treat them the
same could create very different outcomes for each. 170
Ambiguity and a hodgepodge of sweeping state information
privacy laws have the propensity to suffocate the use of technologies
166. See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry, A Federal Privacy Law Could Do Better Than California’s,
BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/04/29/afederal-privacy-law-could-do-better-than-californias/ [https://perma.cc/P3C8-36K5] (noting how
privacy advocates and California representatives in Congress feel the CCPA must be insulated from
preemption); Privacy Preemption Watch, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/preemption/
[https://perma.cc/L5Q8-U24P] (advocating for a federal baseline law and arguing that preemption stops
states from performing their traditional roles as “laboratories of democracy” (quoting New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
167. Kerry, supra note 166.
168. Latest Study Shows Heightened Importance of Retail to the U.S. Economy, NAT ’L RETAIL FED’N:
ECON. (July 20, 2020) (citing NAT’L RETAIL FED’N & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE US RETAIL INDUSTRY (2020)), https://nrf.com/blog/latest-study-showsheightened-importance-retail-us-economy [https://perma.cc/8NX3-C5ZQ]; Gross Domestic Product,
Fourth Quarter and Year 2019 (Advance Estimate), BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Jan. 30, 2020)
[hereinafter GDP Q4 2019], https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarterand-year-2019-advance-estimate [https://perma.cc/RS5T-UM2H].
169. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 15; NRF Says ‘State of the Economy is Sound’ and
Forecasts Retail Sales Will Grow Between 3.8 and 4.4 Percent, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N: ECON. (Feb. 5,
2019) [hereinafter NRF Forecasts], https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/nrf-says-state-economysound-and-forecasts-retail-sales-will-grow [https://perma.cc/6NX9-3CLH] (estimating retail sales at
more than $3.8 trillion in 2019); see also State of Retail, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N: ECON.,
https://nrf.com/insights/economy/state-retail [https://perma.cc/WDJ6-WNLW] (“Of the top 50 online
retailers, nearly all operate stores.”).
170. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.1.
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that often take years to develop and roll out across physical retail
locations.171 Legacy infrastructures and the realities of operating at
scale in a three-dimensional space require significant planning,
engineering, manpower, and outlays of capital that could easily favor
online over brick-and-mortar retail.172 As such, neither the bills and
drafts introduced in the 116th Congress nor GDPR-, CCPA-, or
CPRA-style laws adequately provide a clear path for developing and
implementing in-store technology.173 Moreover, unlike the wealth of
FTC settlements, likened to common law and available for online
privacy, counsel in the brick-and-mortar context is noticeably absent
and several questions remain unanswered. 174 This is particularly
problematic given that the risks and costs of innovation are
significantly higher in brick-and-mortar than online—a
miscalculation cannot be remedied with keystrokes and lines of
code.175
Additionally, because in-store analytics technologies are just
beginning to gain traction, a targeted federal act will allow
policymakers to get in front of information privacy issues.176 With
some healthy guardrails, privacy regulation can grow alongside
innovation. And a targeted federal act could serve as a testing and
learning ground for privacy policy innovation for possible application
across a myriad of other smart spaces on the horizon, such as smart
cities, hotels, and factories. 177 Further, rather than working with
hundreds of different stakeholders across sectors on each move,
policymakers would be able to narrow their focus to the retail sector,
allowing for greater efficiency and a better chance of success.

171. See discussion supra Section II.A.2; see also NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 27–29 (showing the
large differences between technological capabilities online and the three-dimensional store); NRF
Comment Letter, supra note 67, at 5–6 (explaining that without some harmonization of regulatory laws,
businesses may cease “their investment in technological innovations that would better serve
consumers . . . out of fear of tripping over a hodge-podge of potentially conflicting . . . regulations”).
172. See discussion supra Section II.A.2; NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 29.
173. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.1.
174. See discussion supra Section I.B.
175. See discussion supra Section II.A.2; NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 29.
176. See SKORUPA, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
177. Ganesan et al., supra note 6.
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Findings from this act could then inform information privacy reform
in other relevant sectors.
Although a targeted act lends to a continuation of the sectoral
approach generally disfavored by privacy advocates, it may be the
best solution to address brick-and-mortar concerns because of its
ability to take stock of contextual and informational norms relevant
to the industry. This flexibility would allow for more transparent and
comprehensive regulation, as it has already done for sectors like
healthcare and finance. 178 And it does not preclude an omnibus law
later; a savings provision could simply preserve the act.
C. More Business Accountability and FTC Enforcement
To operate effectively, however, strong accountability and
enforcement mechanisms will need to accompany any act. The
current privacy regime is generally viewed as insufficient in this
regard, yet with popular consumer control models, lawmakers appear
to provide consumers with more of the same—“a horse in a
self-driving car world.”179 At first blush, consumer control models
appear to provide consumers with the greatest protections.180 In
practice, however, they may do just the opposite because they
continue to rely on broken consent models and place the
responsibility of protecting privacy on consumers, despite
recognizing that they are unfit for the task.181
Moreover, simply mirroring a hastily passed CCPA at the expense
of businesses will not provide consumers or businesses with a fair or
adequate solution.182 To properly balance competing consumer and
business interests, a federal privacy law should adopt more of a
business accountability approach, shifting the burden of protecting
privacy to the businesses, data brokers, and executives that hold
178. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 238.
179. Polina Arsentyeva, It’s 2019, So Why Are We Still Talking About Opt-In Consent?, IAPP (Nov.
12,
2019),
https://iapp.org/news/a/its-2019-so-why-are-we-still-talking-about-opt-in-consent/
[https://perma.cc/QT69-LCJE]; see also discussion supra Section II.A. See generally Kerry & Chin,
supra note 116.
180. See discussion supra Section II.B.1; see also Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 6.
181. See discussion supra Section II.B.1; Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 5–6.
182. See Wakabayashi, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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consumer data, while using duties of care to allow flexibility and
innovation to develop systems and processes that do not depend on
intrusive surveillance.183
To complement this shift, a federal regulator is also necessary to
ensure that profit motives do not lead to blatant violations, like those
by Facebook.184 Despite concerns that the FTC is not up to the task,
no enforcement candidate seems better suited for the job.185 The
reality is that the FTC’s legal authority over privacy is the same as it
was before the internet. 186 The FTC also remains “woefully
understaffed in privacy, with some [forty] full-time staff
members . . . dedicated to protecting the privacy of more than 320
million Americans” and overseeing over 32 million businesses.187 In
comparison, Britain has more than 700 staff members, and Ireland
and Canada each have almost 150 staff members, despite the fact that
both of these countries have smaller populations than the United
States.188
Yet, in spite of these constraints and limited resources, the FTC
has earned itself the title of “de facto federal data protection
authority,” and unlike any new agency, the FTC has decades of
experience in handling privacy issues and appears willing to pursue
the corporate giants. 189 As such, the FTC could take on many more
cases and step up to lead the U.S. privacy regulatory effort if properly
183. Kerry, supra note 166 (“The effectiveness of [exclusive focus on control] is becoming a mirage
as the amount and pace of data collection keeps expanding. . . . Privacy experts widely believe that the
law needs to shift the burden away from individuals and onto the businesses that collect personal
information.”).
184. See generally Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49.
185. Id.; see also Rich, supra note 49.
186. See Rich, supra note 49 (noting that the FTC Act “was passed more than 100 years ago, long
before personal computers, the internet, social media or mobile phones were invented” and is no longer
enough to protect privacy).
187. Id.; Todd Kehoe, What Counts As a ‘Business’? It Might Not Be What You Think It Is, ALBANY
BUS.
REV.:
DATA
DROP
(Apr.
11,
2019,
2:39
PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/albany/news/2019/04/11/number-of-businesses-in-the-united-states.html
[https://perma.cc/AZ9F-Y6H8].
188. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49; Rich, supra note 49.
189. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 600; Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49 (noting that even with
its severe limitations, the FTC has bolstered important norms, influenced company practices, and
become a significant enforcement agency that the industry pays attention to); Rich, supra note 49 (“The
F.T.C. has nevertheless built a strong privacy program . . . .”).
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equipped to do so.190 Specifically, the FTC should be given greater
resources and a staff more proportional to the population size it
serves; enhanced enforcement authority, including the ability to
impose civil fines for first-time violations; and limited power to
interpret specific provisions by adopting rules. 191 Although granting
the FTC rulemaking authority has been criticized on account of
alleged overreach in the past, the grant here would be limited, thus
curtailing any such risk.192
Despite this expansion of FTC powers, accountability among
corporate titans will still demand more to ensure that the FTC is not
simply chasing headlines with drop-in-the-bucket fines, as FTC
Commissioner Rohit Chopra has already accused his fellow FTC
commissioners of doing.193 To that end, some bills have sought to
empower individuals with a PRA.194 However, although deputizing
individuals as “private attorneys general” would certainly serve as an
enforcement multiplier, this measure would again place the burden of
enforcing privacy on consumers who would either be excluded by or
forced to absorb the costs of litigation. Notably, a PRA could also
bring a reform effort to an impasse.195
190. See generally Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49.
191. See generally Rich, supra note 49.
192. Propes, supra note 73.
193. Emily Birnbaum, FTC Dem: Regulators Are ‘Drinking the Kool-Aid’ of Monopolists, THE HILL
(Nov.
14,
2019,
12:37
PM)
(quoting
FTC
Commissioner
Rohit
Chopra),
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/470488-ftc-dem-worries-regulators-drinking-the-kool-aid-ofmonopolists [https://perma.cc/587J-MXXF]; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49.
194. See Press Release, supra note 111; Kerry, supra note 71; Bambauer Statement, supra note 110,
at 3 and accompanying text.
195. Birnbaum, supra note 40 (noting that a PRA is one of two issues that has stalled negotiations for
months and pointing out that the House’s latest bipartisan federal draft bill has sidestepped the PRA
issue to try to move forward). See generally Theodore F. Claypoole, Private Right of Action vs.
Statutory Damages. Which Has More Impact?, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/private-right-action-vs-statutory-damages-which-has-moreimpact [https://perma.cc/R4BL-HBDL] (offering insight into one side of the PRA debate focused on
concerns for nuisance lawsuits and class-actions, arguing that a PRA could lead to a slew of frivolous,
resource-consuming lawsuits). But see generally Joseph Jerome, Private Right of Action Shouldn’t Be a
Yes-No Proposition in Federal US Privacy Legislation, IAPP (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://iapp.org/news/a/private-right-of-action-shouldnt-be-a-yes-no-proposition-in-federal-privacylegislation/ [https://perma.cc/6APU-WVGU] (explaining that Congress and the courts have a huge say
in how much litigation results, noting the benefits of a PRA, and arguing that if properly constructed, a
PRA could advance privacy rights at the national level); Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, In
Privacy Legislation, a Private Right of Action Is Not an All-or-Nothing Proposition, BROOKINGS:
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Instead, consumers might be better served by providing
accountability and personal liability for corporate executives,
empowering and appropriately staffing the FTC, and using state
attorneys general as an enforcement backstop.196 Under the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), the FTC and
state attorneys general have already proven that they can successfully
share enforcement powers.197 Enforcement through these capable
means would also provide consumers with consistent outcomes and
provide a more robust process through which noncompliance could
be steadily monitored and remedied. 198
D. Specific Brick-and-Mortar Considerations
One-size-fits-all approaches provided in industry-neutral and
channel-neutral provisions are unrealistic and “untethered to the
realities of operating at scale” in the physical retail environment. 199
Instead, a uniform act could provide much-needed clarity for both the
brick-and-mortar store and the consumer. Specific considerations
should include: a fixed, narrow definition of PII; reasonable
consumer control; a general duty of care; and enhanced notice via
modern technology solutions.
1. Fixed, Narrow Definition of PII
PII is probably best described as a moving target; distinctions
between PII and non-PII are not fixed and depend upon
ever-changing technological capabilities to reidentify non-PII such
that “today’s non-PII might be tomorrow’s PII.”200 Because of this
malleable nature, broad definitions such as “linked or reasonably
TECHTANK (July 7, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/07/07/in-privacy-legislationa-private-right-of-action-is-not-an-all-or-nothing-proposition/
[https://perma.cc/3W93-P2P6]
(explaining that despite polar positions on a PRA, a PRA is not an all-or-nothing proposition and
proposing a tiered substantive rights approach as a possible way forward).
196. See, e.g., USCDPA, supra note 69, at 20–22.
197. Stoller & Brody, supra note 154.
198. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ILL-SUITED: PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AND
PRIVACY CLAIMS 19 (July 2019).
199. See RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2.
200. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1846.
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linkable” are unclear and unfairly place all of the risk on
brick-and-mortar businesses. Instead, a fixed, narrow definition of
PII should be used to trigger the greatest business obligations based
on truly sensitive, individually identifiable information linked to a
real risk of significant harm.201
As such, aggregated and de-identified information, for which a
company has no reasonable basis to believe could be used to identify
an individual, should be expressly excluded from this definition. A
de-identification standard, which outlines permitted methods for
achieving de-identification, could be used to prevent users from
circumventing compliance. 202 Further, as an additional consideration,
PII could be classified regarding the specific context of
brick-and-mortar data processing, rather than regarding generic
determinations, which may not address relevant categories of
information.203
Although broader definitions of PII may better address
technological advances, a catch-all, like “any other identifier that the
FTC determines as identifiable,” could be added to the definition to
account for this needed flexibility. 204 Even with this addition, this
fixed definition would create a clearer understanding of business
obligations and consumer rights. It would also reduce compliance
expenses stemming from broad definitions of PII and allow
businesses the flexibility to continue innovating and serving
consumers in expected and convenient ways.
201. See RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2.
202. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE REGARDING METHODS FOR
DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE 6–9 (2015). Under
HIPAA, there are two methods to achieve de-identification: (1) through expert determination and (2)
through removal of a list of specified identifiers coupled with no actual knowledge that the information
could be used to identify an individual who is a subject of the information. Id. at 7.
203. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1847–48 (explaining that abstract determinations of
PII are insufficient because the ability to identify information is driven by context, and providing
explanatory examples); see also RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2 (making a similar
argument).
204. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(F) (“The term ‘personal information’ means individually
identifiable information about an individual collected online, including . . . any other identifier that the
Commission determines permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual . . . .”). Under
this authority, the FTC has indeed acted to expand the definition of PII in COPPA. Schwartz & Solove,
supra note 36, at 1835.
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2. General Duty of Care
Additionally, including a general duty of care—like some of the
116th Congress drafts—could provide a second tier of protections for
data that falls outside the definition of PII. 205 This duty of care could
include reasonable measures not to cause reasonably foreseeable
harm during data collection and use; not to discriminate based on
things like religion, sexual orientation, income, medical conditions,
or political beliefs; to collect and retain only the minimum data
necessary to carry out purposes reasonably expected in the
relationship; and to use security practices proportional to the
sensitivity of data. For example, a brick-and-mortar store capturing
location data through mobile analytics should never be capturing full
location trails extending outside the store, including details such as
other places visited with timestamps, to construct a consumer’s daily
journey.206 Even if this information was not captured within the
definition of PII, this intrusive overreach would easily be captured
under this duty of care.
With respect to in-store analytics technologies, rather than
arbitrarily excluding uncommon technologies, this narrow definition
of PII and general duty of care properly allow for consideration of
technology use in context. 207 Brick-and-mortar stores are not
prohibited from using less invasive technologies to gather invaluable
survival metrics while still appreciating the consumer’s need for
privacy. Anonymized video analytics, for example, which scan video
frames to detect the presence of a face—but do not recognize a face
individually and destroy the video after detection—offer a
positive-sum, “win-win” solution that stores could use to capture
205. See Intel Legislation, supra note 70; Kerry, supra note 71.
206. See Jeff Glueck, Opinion, How to Stop the Abuse of Location Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/opinion/foursquare-privacy-internet.html [https://perma.cc/T6Z9V8U4].
207. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 235. Helen Nissenbaum cautioned against applying moral
categories to technologies without considering context. See id. (“What matters is not merely that a
particular technical device or system is not overly unusual, but that its use in a particular context, in a
particular way is not overly unusual.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Bambauer Statement, supra note
110, at 4 (arguing against user control models because of the potential for “overprotection when
consumers distrust a new data practice that is actually socially and even personally beneficial”).
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many of the metrics discussed in Part I in a privacy-enhancing
way.208
3. Reasonable Consumer Control
To further balance business practicality and burdens, a
“reasonableness” limitation could also be placed on offered consumer
rights. Despite political demand, GDPR- and CCPA-style models that
attempt to give consumers full control of PII often paint an illusory
picture for consumers or fail to actually serve consumer privacy
interests.209 These models position privacy as something consumers
can protect themselves against, but—even with best practices—the
reality of engaging with most technology and participating in the
digital economy means handing over data. 210 Consumers can also
quickly become inundated by obvious or seemingly insignificant
choices and become less attentive to choices that are important to
them.211

208. ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. & PRIV. COMM’R OF ONT., CAN., WHITE PAPER: ANONYMOUS VIDEO
ANALYTICS (AVA) TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 2–4 (2011), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/
Resources/AVAwhite6.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TR6-36XF].
209. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 6; Kerry, supra note 71 (noting that although consumer
control, namely greater transparency and individual decision-making, “ha[s] a place in comprehensive
privacy legislation,” consumer control approaches “are far from sufficient in a digital environment in
which control is so elusive”).
210. Altshuler, supra note 4; Kerry & Chin, supra note 116; Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Privacy Is Not
Your Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019) (quoting Colin Horgan, Tech Isn’t Vulnerable—You
Are, ONEZERO (Sept. 4, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/tech-isnt-vulnerable-you-arede82b8102610
[https://perma.cc/EXJ5-BY3C]),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/opinion/alabama-app-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/WR7TM46K].
211. Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much
of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 995, 996, 999 (2000) (first citing Ravi Dhar,
Consumer Preference for a No-Choice Option, 24 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 215 (1997); then citing Eldar
Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11 (1993); then citing Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky,
Thinking Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice, 24 COGNITION 449 (1992);
then citing John R. Hauser & Birger Wernerfelt, An Evaluation Cost Model of Consideration Sets, 16 J.
CONSUMER RSCH. 393 (1990); then citing John W. Payne, Contingent Decision Behavior, 92 PSYCH.
BULL. 382 (1982); then citing John W. Payne et al., Adaptive Strategy Selection in Decision Making, 14
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 534 (1988); then citing JOHN W. PAYNE
ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER (1993); then citing Danielle Timmermans, The Impact of Task
Complexity on Information Use in Multi-Attribute Decision Making, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 95
(1993); and then citing Peter Wright, Consumer Choice Strategies: Simplifying vs. Optimizing, 12 J.
MKTG. RSCH. 60 (1975)).
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Full consumer control also presents a risk of burdening the digital
economy with heavy transaction costs, despite little reason to think
that compliance will have a meaningful relationship to mitigating
consumer harms.212 Data portability provisions are illustrative of this
point. Arming consumers with the option to move their data from one
business to another does little to further privacy protection goals.
Individual control is not the same as individual privacy.213 Moreover,
it creates a substantial and unnecessary privacy risk.214
As such, because data collection practices vary widely from one
business to the next, decisions regarding which consumer rights to
offer, when to offer them, and how they are offered should also
depend on context. A privacy approach that evaluates these rights in
context better addresses the unique needs and uses of data by brickand-mortar stores. Specifically concerning consent, to avoid consent
fatigue, a more proportional risk-based concept of consent that
requires explicit consent only where serious harm is threatened could
offer a more practical solution in the context of the store environment
and help make consumer choice more meaningful.215
4. Notice Through 21st Century Technology
Based on the bills and proposals before the 116th Congress, it is
clear that notice or awareness continues to be a key concern. 216
However, lengthy and legalistic privacy policies are wholly
ineffective in actually informing consumers of data practices, even if
they do serve an accountability function for privacy watchdogs. 217
212. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 6.
213. Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of Individual Choice, 98.
CALIF. L. REV. 1765, 1801–02 (2010).
214. See PAVUR & KNERR, supra note 129.
215. Cate, supra note 213, at 1799 (recommending this kind of approach to reduce prohibitive
restrictions on health research); see also Kerry, supra note 13 (noting that perhaps informed consent was
practical two decades ago, but in a world with constant streams of digital interactions, today it “is a
fantasy”).
216. See PAVUR & KNERR, supra note 129.
217. Kerry, supra note 71; see also Joseph Turow, Opinion, Let’s Retire the Phrase ‘Privacy Policy,’
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/opinion/20Turow.html
[https://perma.cc/JN4B-WCMP] (noting that a majority of consumers actually interpret the mere
presence of a privacy policy on a business’s website as an indication that it will not share the
individual’s information with other websites or companies without the consumer’s permission).
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Additionally, in the specific context of in-store analytics
technologies, notices placed on websites or signs placed at store
entrances can be problematic given that these technologies are
largely invisible to consumers inside the store.218
As an immediate solution for stores that also have an online
presence, as regulators have done with the GDPR, a privacy policy
template could be created to at least standardize how and what
information is presented across websites.219 Additionally, because
notice must serve the purpose of both informing consumers and
acting as an accountability mechanism, creating a two-tiered system
appears to offer a simple solution here. 220 For regulators, a plain
disclosure on data practices for consumers and periodic data
protection reports certified by business executives could be
required.221 For consumers, a short and simple notice on the
business’s website with options to dive deeper and get more details
on data practices could be required.222 Disclosures based on the
information disclosed in executive certifications could also be
communicated via a centralized consumer website using standardized
icons, short explanatory videos, and privacy practice scores, much
like restaurant health inspection scores.
At the store level, in addition to a notice placed outside the store,
businesses could also place notices at the shelf-level or at other
relevant points within the store to drive further awareness. And,
looking to the future, many of the same technologies used for
tracking consumers could also be used to provide solutions to
improve transparency. In one scenario, these devices could be

218. FitzGerald, supra note 6; Nguyen, supra note 10; WORLD ECON. F., REDESIGNING DATA
PRIVACY: REIMAGINING NOTICE & CONSENT FOR HUMAN-TECHNOLOGY INTERACTION 7 (2020),
https://www.weforum.org/reports/redesigning-data-privacy-reimagining-notice-consent-forhumantechnology-interaction [https://perma.cc/BFV6-KM2X].
219. See Our Company Privacy Policy, GEN. DATA PROT. REGUL., https://gdpr.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/Our-Company-Privacy-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8TA-WAS9].
220. Kerry & Chin, supra note 116 (detailing the benefits and workings of a two-tiered approach).
221. Id.
222. See Brian Kint, Is It Time to Rethink Notice and Choice As a Fair Information Privacy
Practice?, CYBER L. MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.cyberlawmonitor.com/2019/02/13/is-ittime-to-rethink-notice-and-choice-as-a-fair-information-privacy-practice/
[https://perma.cc/ZY355KUD] (recommending a similar layered privacy notice and explaining how it would work).
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required to “announce” the technology’s presence to consumers by
broadcasting a standardized, continuous wireless signal when in use,
which could be presented to consumers in a myriad of ways. 223 For
example, in dealing with video analytics, a standardized mobile
application could sniff out these technologies and provide the
consumer with a live view into shopper tracking technologies used
within the store.224
In dealing with mobile tracking solutions, open Wi-Fi or Bluetooth
networks could also push a mobile alert to users of the existence of
mobile tracking and allow these consumers to opt out.225
Alternatively, a standardized privacy-enhancing app could allow
users to automatically disable signal transmission when approaching
these networks to avoid collection altogether. 226 In another scenario,
a consumer’s data collection and use preferences could be
programmed into the consumer’s smartphone or wearable device,
like a smartwatch, and used to communicate their privacy preferences
to the tracking devices.227
Although a technology-driven solution certainly presents several
implementation challenges, the reality is that the complexity of
today’s technological landscape and the widespread consumer
adoption of smartphones and other technologies suggest that these
ideas have come of age for advancing privacy outcomes. 228 The
communication norms of modern consumers are very different than
the norms of consumers targeted by the 1980 FIPs and even the
norms of consumers considered by the 116th Congress’s bills and
resolutions.229 The question is, thus, whether Congress will delay the

223. Soltani, supra note 9 (suggesting that passive technology devices could automatically broadcast
standardized, semicontinuous wireless signals that announce their presence as a technical solution to
pervasive data collection in the public sphere).
224. Id.; see also Michael Grothaus, How to Find Hidden Cameras in Your Airbnb, and Anywhere
Else, FAST CO. (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90331449/how-to-find-hidden-camerasin-your-airbnb-and-anywhere-else [https://perma.cc/JC7R-BHS2] (explaining how Wi-Fi sniffing apps
can be used to detect smart devices when Airbnb owners secretly hide cameras in rooms).
225. Soltani, supra note 9.
226. Id.
227. WORLD ECON. F., supra note 218, at 22–23.
228. Id. at 24.
229. See Nehf, supra note 131, at 1733.
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inevitable and make a difficult, eleventh-hour decision after
industries and businesses are already established, or whether
Congress will act now while brick-and-mortar technologies are still
in the early phases of adoption and implementation, which would
arguably be easier. Failures in reaching consumers with notice-andconsent solutions have at least proven that moving forward, a new
approach is necessary. 230 If the problem is technology, perhaps
technology could also offer the solution?
CONCLUSION
Large gaps in current information privacy regulation have left
consumers and businesses alike unsure of the extent of privacy
protections afforded.231 One sector of particular concern is the
approximately $3.38 trillion brick-and-mortar retail industry and
specifically its growing adoption of in-store analytics technologies.232
Despite renewed interest in privacy reform, these efforts have
focused largely on online information privacy, leaving many
questions as to the fate of new and emerging brick-and-mortar
technologies that mimic online tracking. 233 Because these in-store
analytics technologies are critical to helping traditional stores regain
relevance among modern shoppers and compete against online
competitors, there is a dire need to create a focused information
privacy act.234 Otherwise, in-store analytics technologies could be
swept up under broader online privacy reform and rendered obsolete.
A targeted, uniform federal privacy act will ensure that consumers do
not pay with their privacy and that brick-and-mortar stores secure a
place in the future.

230. See id.; SENATE DEMOCRATS, supra note 70; Kerry, supra note 71; Developing the
Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,600, 48,601 (Sept. 26, 2018)
(emphasizing that, to date, notice-and-choice mandates have resulted primarily in long, legal,
regulator-focused privacy policies, only helping a small number of users).
231. See discussion supra Section II.A.
232. See NRF Forecasts, supra note 169; GDP Q4 2019, supra note 168.
233. See discussion supra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2.
234. See discussion supra Part I.
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